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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDTNGS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j), this case having been transferred to
the Utah Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on December 15,
2000.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Appellants'

business operation was not grandfathered by Salt Lake County's granting of a business
license to Appellants prior to the annexation of the property by the City of South Salt
Lake. This issue presents a question of law as to the interpretation of §10-9-408, Utah
Code Annotated, for which the standard of review is correctness. See, e.g., Hugoe v.
Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame,
836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

2.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Appellants had

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing to seek administrative review by
the business license hearing board of the City of South Salt Lake, when the City failed to
follow its own ordinances concerning its rescinding or denial of Appellants5 business
license. This issue also presents a question of law, reviewable for correctness. Id.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the City's denial of

the rezone application concerning Appellants' property was not arbitrary, capricious, and
constituted or condoned an illegal reverse spot zoning of the area in which Appellants'
property is situated. In reviewing a municipality's decision not to change the zoning
classification of a property, the decision is presumed to be valid and the standard of
review is to "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). The definitions of "arbitrary" and "capricious"
are legal issues reviewed for correctness. Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT
App 31 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of
Springville, 1999 UT 25, P22, 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999).
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRO VISIONS,
STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
Utah Code Annotated, §10-9-408.
10-9-408.
Nonconforming uses and structures.
(1)
(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or
structure may be continued.
The full text of § 10-9-408 appears in the Addendum to this brief.

§ 19.48.010, etseq., of the Salt Lake County zoning regulations.
The full text of §19.48 of the Salt Lake County zoning regulations appears
in the Addendum to this brief.

§ 5.02.170 of the ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake (4/98).
5.02.170
Notice of denial, suspension or revocation.
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a business license application or
business license, the business license official shall cause written notice to be given
by personal service or registered mail to the applicant or licensee of his or her
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an application or license. Such notice shall
include the reasons for the denial, suspension or revocation of such application or
license, and shall include any accompanying documentation relating to the
business license official's decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application or
business license. Such notice shall also include a description, if applicable, of the
applicant's or licensee's right to appeal the decision of the business license
official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part)))

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants Ty Webber and Statewide Bail Bonds (hereinafter
referred to as "Statewide") acquired a business license from Salt Lake County for

3

operation of a bail-bonding business out of Mr. Webber's home, located across the street
from the new Salt Lake County Detention Center, at 3350 South 900 West, in Salt Lake
County, prior to annexation of the area by the City of South Salt Lake (hereinafter
referred to as "the City"). Statewide alleges that the business was therefore
grandfathered, so that the City's refusal to issue a current business license to Statewide is
in contravention of Statewide's right to a license.
Statewide has also alleged that, following the administrative decisions
handed down by the City, the City failed to give Statewide proper notice of the City's
denial of the business license in conformity with its own ordinances, and failed to provide
Statewide notice of its right to appeal and the timing and methodology for taking such an
appeal, along with notice of all other administrative remedies that might have been
available. By failing to abide by its own ordinances, the City proceeded in an illegal
manner that rendered Statewide incapable of exhausting any administrative remedies and
makes the City's denial of the business license invalid.
Further, the City's refusal to rezone the area in which Statewide's business
is located constitutes a refusal to acknowledge that the site is surrounded on three sides by
massive commercial, light- industrial, and very large government complexes, so that
denying the rezoning of this small site constitutes an illegal reverse spot zone, making the
City's refusal to rezone arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 23, 1998, Appellants Ty Webber and Statewide

Bail Bonds paid the required business license fee and applied for a business license from
Salt Lake County, to operate a bail bonding company at the location of 3350 South 900
West, Salt Lake County (R. 187; 242, Tj 4).
2.

Salt Lake County issued a business license to Statewide Bail Bonds

effective as of July 23, 1998 (R. 13; 243,16; 282-3; Addenda 4, 5, 6).
3.

Salt Lake County was in the process of converting its computer

system from one program to another, so a printed copy of the business license was not
prepared until November 4, 1998, but Statewide Bail Bonds was legally conducting
business in Salt Lake County as of July 23, 1998 (R. 93; 238; 282; Addendum 6).
4.

The bail bonding company was licensed at the location of 3350

South 900 West as a home occupation/business, which was a permitted conditional use
within the A-l (agricultural) zone and was appropriate under Tf 19.48.030 of the Salt
Lake County zoning regulations (R. 116-117, 287-288; Addendum 6).
5.

The area within which Statewide's property lies was annexed to

South Salt Lake City effective October 1, 1998 (R. 104, 170, 244).
6.

Statewide's business was grandfathered at the time of the annexation

both by virtue of Statewide having acquired a proper business license from Salt Lake
County prior to the annexation and by virtue of Statewide's legal operation of a home
5

business in an area zoned A-l ? where such businesses were authorized (§ 10-9-408, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Addendum 1).
6.

On July 2, 1999, representatives of South Salt Lake wrote a letter to

Statewide (R. 10-11, 57-58, 120-121), alleging that:
a.

At the time of annexation, the business was operating under a

business license issued by Salt Lake County;
b.

The City of South Salt Lake honored that license by allowing

the bail-bonding office to continue as a nonconforming use, with the provision that
it meet all building code requirements for a business;
c.

The City had "discovered that the business license issued to

[Statewide] by the county was in violation of the zoning regulations of the County
and should NOT have been issued" and therefore the business did not have any
legal nonconforming status;
d.

The City would not issue "a new license" for the property but

would allow a reasonable time for the operations to be relocated "before taking
any steps to force complete cessation of operations";
e.

The City would allow operation for the remainder of the 1999

calendar year provided certain conditions were met;
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f.

Statewide needed to obtain an inspection of the property,

make all necessary corrections, and cease all storage within thirty days or cease all
operations and relocate within the same time frame;
g.

Should Statewide wish to desire to continue with a request for

a change in zoning, it needed to "finish the Community Council process and
submit a petition to the Planning office, and, at the same time, request a review of
the General Plan."
7.

The letter of July 2, 1999, did not state how Statewide's business

license issued by the County was in violation of the zoning regulations; it was not a denial
of a current business license application; and it did not contain a notice to Statewide of
the proper forum and time frame for appealing a denial of a business license (R. 10-11,
57-58, 120-121; Addendum 10).
8.

Under § 5.02.170 of the ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake

(4/98), the City was required to "cause written notice to be given by personal service or
registered mail to the applicant or licensee" of the City's decision to deny, suspend or
revoke an application or license, and the notice must include the reasons for the denial,
suspension or revocation and must include a description of the applicant's or licensee's
right to appeal the decision of the business license official (Addendum 3).
9.

The City admitted, in f 6 of its "Statement of Facts" in its

memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, that it notified Statewide

by means of the letter of July 2, 1999, that its "business license application" was denied
(R. 105). This statement is misleading, but is an admission that this notice was not
personally served upon Statewide nor was it sent by registered mail, nor did it contain a
notice of Statewide's rights to appeal and the time frame for such an appeal, so that the
notice did not comply with the City's own ordinances (R. 245, 10, 57, 120, Addenda 3,
10).
10.

Prior to receipt of the City's letter, in an attempt to legally be capable

of storing vehicles and other items taken as collateral in the bail bonding business, Mr.
Webber and Statewide applied (on June 2, 1999) for a rezoning of their property for
commercial usage (R. 245, % 14). This effort, however, was merely an additional effort to
ensure complete compliance with South Salt Lake City's desires, and had (and has) no
effect upon the grandfathering of the license and the legal operation of the home business.
11.

When Statewide's rezoning application came before the City's

Planning Commission on October 19, 1999 (R. 127-129), in a genuine misrepresentation
of actual facts a member of the planning staff advised the Commission that Statewide's
business license from Salt Lake County had been erroneously issued (contrary to the
County's own position (Addenda 4, 5, 6)); that the property surrounding the subject
property was zoned agricultural (contrary to the light industrial zoning that actually exists
east and south of the subject property (R. 326)); that the general plan called for the area to
remain agricultural (constituting a spot zone of agricultural use in an area of rapidly
8

growing business, government, and light industrial usages); and that the planning staff
recommended denial of the rezoning (contrary to the City's own inspector stating
otherwise to Mr. Webber and admitting that the City needed to take a new look at the area
(R.246,f 16).
12.

Public comment at the hearing included a statement by one property

owner that he had no objection to a change in the zoning of his property (which fronted
on 900 West in likewise fashion as Statewide's property) so long as he was allowed to
keep horses, and other comments included statements that the agricultural zone should
remain where it actually exists, behind the buildings fronting 900 West. It was pointed
out that the Sheriffs Office new substation was going to be built immediately south of
the subject property (R. 127-128).
13.

The Planning and Zoning Commission voted to recommend denial of

the application on four grounds: (1) rezoning would not conform to the General Plan; (2)
rezoning would amount to spot zoning; (3) the city should retain the remaining
agricultural land in its boundaries as agricultural; and (4) two-thirds of the City contains
other property zoned to permit a bail-bonding business (R. 128-129).
14.

A public hearing on the rezoning application was held before the

City Council on January 12, 2000, at which the same issues of maintaining the
agricultural character of the area, conforming with the general plan, and spot zoning were
discussed. The Council denied the rezoning application (R. 131-137).
9

15.

Findings and Conclusions were prepared on January 20, 2000. The

Findings failed to set forth the manner or details as to how the bail bonding business was
illegal in an agricultural zone that allows home businesses, and did not address the matter
of the proximity of the light industrial zone to Statewide's property (R. 140-141).
16.

The Conclusions erroneously stated that the parcel is not adjacent to

or contiguous with similar zoning (the areas immediately to the east and to the south are
already light industrial, and the area one-half block north is commercial (R. 324, 326));
that the request is contrary to the current General Plan (more government buildings are
going up in the contiguous area even now (R. 324, 326)); that changing the zoning in the
area was premature (the Sheriffs Office is presently beginning construction of a new call
center facility adjacent to Statewide's property and the City, by its own admission, has
received requests from two other bail bonding facilities to locate in the area (R. 324, 326;
131-137)); and that the operation of a bail bond business from the subject location is
illegal (it was previously approved by Salt Lake County as a home business and
grandfathered as such at the time of the City's annexation of the property (Addenda 4, 5,
and 6)).
17.

The County's zoning ordinance provides in § 19.48.020 that a "home

occupation" is among the "permitted uses" of A-l Agricultural zone property. It does not
define the meaning of "home occupation" (R.l 17, 287; Addendum 2).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Statewide's argument is three part. First, before the subject property was
annexed into South Salt Lake City, it was subject to the zoning and business licensing
regulations of Salt Lake County. The County issued Statewide a valid business license
for the operation of a home-based bail-bonding business at its location directly across the
street from the new Salt Lake County Detention Center. The County has verified,
through letter, affidavit, and deposition, that Statewide's license was valid. Statewide's
business was therefore grandfathered at the time it was annexed into South Salt Lake
City.
Secondly, when the City decided to rescind or revoke Statewide's business
license, it did not follow the procedures outlined in its own ordinances, in that the notice
was not properly delivered, did not contain an official denial of the application, did not
set forth explanations for the denial, and did not give notice of Statewide's right,
methodology, and timing for appealing the City's denial of the license. The City's action
was therefore invalid.
Lastly, the entire character of the area in which Statewide's business is
located has changed dramatically over the period of the past five years, with the
construction of a number of County and State facilities surrounding Statewide's property
on three sides. On 900 West, only a small strip of five homes between 3300 South and
Statewide's location at 3350 South remains non-commercial or non-light-industrial. The
11

other side of the street was already rezoned, and the west side of 900 West appears to be
perhaps the only street in South Salt Lake City that does not have identical zoning
designations on both sides of the street. The City's refusal to rezone this small area is
unreasonable and irrational, and constitutes a reverse spot zoning of the area that is
capricious, arbitrary, and illegal. It simply does not make sense in light of the land use in
the local area.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STATEWIDE OPERATED UNDER A VALID
BUSINESS LICENSE ISSUED BY SALT LAKE COUNTY PRIOR
TO THE CITY'S ANNEXATION OF THE PROPERTY.
The City's planning staff has claimed that Statewide had illegally obtained
its business license from Salt Lake County. R. 120-121. However, the City has totally
and completely failed to specify how or in what manner the license was obtained
illegally. It has simply made a blanket statement, without providing reasons or pointing
to ordinances or giving any evidence to back up that statement.
The City has totally failed to address the fact that Statewide legally and
lawfully operated a home business in an A-1 zone, authorized under the zoning
regulations of Salt Lake County (R. 238-241, 243; Add. 6), both prior to the annexation
of the property by South Salt Lake City and at the present time. The County's regulations
pertaining to A-1 agricultural zones clearly state that "home occupations" are permitted as
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conditional uses in the A-l zone. The ordinance does not define "home occupation"; it
simply and unequivocally states, "home occupation." Addendum 2.
The nature of Statewide's business is quite plainly articulated in the name
of the business, i.e., "Statewide Bail Bonds." Statewide made no attempt to disguise the
nature of the business~the County knew what type of business it was licensing when it
issued the license. Addendum 9. Statewide deposed Russell Lawson, the Manager of
Salt Lake County Public Works Department, Planning and Development Services
Division, who testified the County checked its records and ordinances, determined the
business was appropriate as a home occupation in its location, and issued a license for the
operation of Statewide Bail Bonds at its present location. Addenda 4, 5, and 6.
At the time of this deposition, the City appeared to question the right of
Mr. Lawson's department to issue the conditional use permit. Addendum 6, p. 25.
Mr. Lawson testified that it was the policy of the department to do so in circumstances
such as those presented by Statewide. This appellate court recently reviewed a similar
situation in the case of Busche v. Salt Lake County, 2001 UT App 111,418 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), and specifically held that the Salt Lake County zoning
ordinances, in the specific chapter governing the procedure for conditional use permit
approval, authorized the planning commission to "delegate to the development services
division director the authority to approve, modify or deny all or part of the conditional
uses set forth in this title." Citing, Salt Lake County, Utah, Uniform Zoning Ordinance,
13

ch. 19.84.060. The City did not raise this point in its motion for summary judgment, but
the case law appears to have made it moot, and lays to rest the City's claims that the
license was obtained illegally.
Statewide's business therefore lawfully existed at the time of the annexation
of the property, and thus it is grandfathered, pursuant to §10-9-408, Utah Code
Annotated, which provides simply and straightforwardly: "(1) ( a ) Except as provided in
this section, a nonconforming use or structure may be continued." Since none of the
subsequent provisions of § 10-9-408 are applicable in this case, the continued use is
appropriate. Addendum 1.
Statewide contends that the home occupation is still legal in the A-l zone,
as it exists and is defined in the ordinances of South Salt Lake City, so that it is actually
not a nonconforming use, but whether or not the present business license authorities are in
agreement as to the proper interpretation of the statute, the business's grandfathered status
is recognized by law and has constitutional protections against "taking" by the City.
The Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation in the case of Thomas S.
"Steve " and Nancy C. Brown, et ah, v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, et ah (957 P.2d
207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)), wherein Sandy City's Community Development Staff began
interpreting the Sandy City Code as prohibiting rental of any single-family dwelling for
fewer than thirty days, although the Code defined only occupancy of the dwellings within
the city, and not the duration of that occupancy. The appellate court affirmed that it must
14

construe existing zoning ordinances strictly against the city, and found that since shortterm leases of residential properties were not prohibited by the zoning ordinance, they
were permissible. Justice Bench added the comment that Sandy had taken the position
that:
. . . every use of property is prohibited unless the use is specifically permitted by
ordinance. That approach to zoning is diametrically opposed to the common law
followed in Utah. See, e.g., Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating zoning ordinances are to be strictly
construed against the municipality because they are "in derogation of a property
owner's common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property").
Id., at 213. Thus, short-term rentals were permitted in Sandy unless the city passed an
ordinance to specifically prohibit them.
The situation herein is clearly analogous: Neither Salt Lake County nor the
City of South Salt Lake presently prohibits bail-bonding companies from being operated
within A-l zones as "home occupations." Addenda 2, 3. The South Salt Lake City
zoning ordinance does not cover bonding companies anywhere (at least, it did not in
1999, although the ordinance may have been amended since the time of Statewide's
application). Bonding companies are not excluded in any zone; they are not listed as
belonging in any zone. Absent such a prohibition, the statutes must be construed as
allowing bail-bonding companies in A-l zones. A review of the ordinances would
suggest that bail-bonding companies would most appropriately be placed in light
industrial zones, but they are not inappropriate in an A-l zone.

15

A similar case came before the Utah Court of Appeals in 1999, wherein
Woods Cross City argued that Hugoe Trucking's use of its property was never legally
established, and therefore could not qualify as a legal nonconforming use. The appellate
court disagreed, finding that when Hugoe purchased the property it was zoned so that a
"transfer company" was included within a list of forty-nine permitted uses. The court
noted:
Although transfer company is not defined in the ordinance, it is typically held to
include "any company in the business of transporting freight or other products for
hire." [Citation omitted.] Moreover, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation
of a property owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property,
provisions therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed . . . in favor
of the property owner." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d
602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The trial court thus correctly determined that
"Hugoe Trucking is a 'transfer company' within the meaning of [the city's] prior
zoning ordinance." Hence, because transfer company is a permitted use under the
former C-2 ordinance, appellees' use of the property "legally existed before its
current zoning designation." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(l)(l)(i) (Supp. 1999).
Accordingly, appellees' use of the property meets the definition of nonconforming
use, and the change from C-2 to 1-1 does not affect their right to continue using the
property just as they had before the zoning change.
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
The instant case is again analogous: Statewide obtained a business license
from Salt Lake County as a home occupation, a conditional use in an A-l agricultural
zone. No matter how South Salt Lake City may define a "home occupation," the granting
of the license by the County conferred upon Statewide the status of "legally existing." If
the City differs in its definition of "home occupation," it needs to legislate the meaning it
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desires the term to convey, and thus change the meaning of the zoning ordinance, but
Statewide will still then be entitled to continue as a valid nonconforming use.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS HAD FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY FAILING TO SEEK
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BY THE BUSINESS LICENSE
HEARING BOARD OF CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE OF THE
DENIED BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION.
The City presented little evidence in support of its claim that Statewide
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies for denial of its business license application
and that the trial court was therefore deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. The exhibits
submitted by the City in support of this claim were:
(1)

Chapter 19.48.01 through .05 of the Salt Lake County Zoning

Ordinance (Addendum 2);
(2)

The business license issued to Statewide by Salt Lake County (R.

119; Addendum 9);
(3)

The July 2, 1999, letter to Statewide from officials of the City (R.

120-121; Addendum 10); and
(4)

South Salt Lake City Ordinance § 5.02.190A (setting forth the

methodology for appealing the denial, revoking, or rescinding of a business license)
(Addendum 3).
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Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 19.48
Chapter 19.48 of the County's zoning regulations identify permitted and
conditional uses in A-1 agricultural zones. Addendum 2. The regulations clearly include
"home occupations" as conditional uses in the A-1 zone. The ordinance does not define
"home occupation"; it simply and unequivocally states, "home occupation." Addendum
2.
The nature of Statewide's business is plainly articulated in the name of the
business, i.e., "Statewide Bail Bonds." Statewide made no attempt to disguise the nature
of the business—the County knew what type of business it was licensing when it issued
the license. R. 119, 189. Prior to the oral argument on the parties' counter motions for
summary judgment, Statewide deposed Russell Lawson, the Manager of the Salt Lake
County Public Works Department, Planning and Development Services Division (see
Addendum 6 for deposition transcript), who testified that on July 23, 1998, Ty Webber
made application for a business license for Statewide Bail Bonds (Deposition, pp. 8, 9,
10, 12, 29, 32); the County checked the zoning map {id., pp. 8, 21), determined that
under the zoning ordinance the business was appropriate as a home occupation in its
location (id., pp. 8. 17-18, 24-25), and issued approval for the authorized operation of
Statewide Bail Bonds at its present location (id, p. 9, 14-15). Mr. Lawson testified that
no other procedures were required; that the business was not of a type that required
application or appearance before a planning and zoning commission or other review
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board and that it was the policy of the County that his department had the power to grant
the permit and issue the license (id., pp. 10, 16, 25-26); that his department followed
normal procedures when it issued Statewide's license (id., pp. 10, 16, 25-26, 30); and that
the license was appropriately issued in the ordinary course of his department's operations
(id., pp. 16, 32-34). Mr. Lawson also testified that his department began using a new
computer system in April of 1998 and that they had a lot of trouble with the new system,
so that it was not until November 4 that the actual hard copy of the license was printed
out (id., pp. 13, 31, 32-33), but his department considered Statewide's business to be
authorized and the business license to be effective as of July 23, 1998 (id., pp. 11, 14, 15,
35-36).
The City has presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of
Mr. Lawson; in fact, the City objected to Statewide's motion for continuance of the oral
argument, which would have allowed the taking of other depositions, and insisted that the
oral arguments proceed using the evidence then existing. R. 395-406. Mr. Lawson's
uncontroverted testimony therefore stands: His department followed its usual policies
and issued a business license to Statewide that had been in effect for one and one-half
months before Statewide's property was annexed into the City.
As explained by Mr. Lawson, the Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance
supports and authorizes the issuance of Statewide's business license. At the very least
this testimony presents a genuine issue of fact that precludes the entry of summary
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judgment in this matter. At most, it establishes the grandfathered status of Statewide's
business operation, which precludes the City's interference in the business. This item of
evidence does not support the City's position.

The business license issued to Statewide by Salt Lake County
The actual printed copy of Statewide's business license bears the date of
issuance of November 4, 1998 (Add. 9), which would appear to support the City's claims
that it was illegally issued. However, the testimony provided by Russell Lawson by letter
(Addendum 4), by affidavit (Addendum 5), and finally in his deposition (Addendum 6),
explains that the printed date bore no relationship to the date on which the business
application was actually approved. To the contrary, all the other evidence explains that
the November 4 date only appeared because of problems with a new computer program.
The other information appearing on the face of the license shows that Ty
Webber revealed that he wished to operate a bail-bonding business at his home location,
and that the business was a "mail and phone" home occupation, approved by the County
Zoning Department. The business license therefore gives no support to the City's claims.

The July 2, 1999, letter to Statewide from the City
This letter actually supports Statewide's position, not the City's. In this
letter (Add. 10), the City states that the business license issued by the County was "in
violation of the zoning regulations of the County and should NOT have been issued" and
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that an "A-l zone . . . does NOT allow business of your type (the same as the County)."
These statements are unsubstantiated and without foundation, and were repudiated by the
letter, affidavit, and deposition testimony of Russell Lawson.
Of more importance, however, this letter does not follow the requirements
set forth in the City's own ordinances regarding denial, rescinding, or revoking of a
business license. South Salt Lake City ordinance § 5.02.170 (Addendum 3) states:
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a business license application or
business license, thee business license official shal cause written notice to be given
by personal service or registered mail to the applicant or licensee of his or her
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an application or license. Such notice shall
include the reasons for the denial, suspension or revocation of such application or
license, and shall include any accompanying documentation relating to the
business license official's decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application or
business license. Such notice shall also include a description, if applicable, of the
applicant's or licensee's right to appeal the decision of the business license
official. (Italics added.)
This letter from South Salt Lake City to Statewide effectively gave
Statewide a conditional license, good through December 31, 1999, subject only to
conditions set forth on an inspection report. Addendum 10. There was no official denial
of Statewide's application, no statement that the license was being suspended or revoked,
and no notice of a right to appeal the decision. This letter did not state how Statewide's
business license issued by the County was in violation of the zoning regulations; it was
not a denial of a current business license application; and it did not contain a notice to
Statewide of the proper forum for appealing a denial of a business license.
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Furthermore, the City has made a de facto admission in its "Statement of
Facts" of its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment (R. 105), that
this notice was not personally served upon Statewide, nor was it sent by registered mail,
nor did it contain a notice of Statewide's right to appeal and the timing and methodology
for taking such an appeal, so that the notice did not comply with the City's own
ordinances. R. 245,112.
Violation of the City's ordinance makes its decision illegal under § 10-91001 (Utah Code Annotated) and as interpreted in the Springville Citizens case (loc. cit).
In another recent zoning case, Hatch v. Boulder Town Council (2001, UT App 55, 415
Utah Adv, Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)), this appellate court held that when the Town of
Boulder failed to "comply strictly" with the statutory requirements in enacting its zoning
ordinance, its ordinance was invalid. By the same reasoning, when the City of South Salt
Lake filed to "comply strictly" with its business license ordinance, its denial of a business
license was invalid. The City's notice was defective in its manner of service and in its
content, making the notice invalid and precluding the City from prevailing on this point.
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POINT III. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF THE REZONE
APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND
CONDONED AN ILLEGAL REVERSE SPOT ZONE OF THE AREA
IN WHICH APPELLANTS' PROPERTY IS SITUATED.
The entire area around Statewide's property is commercial or light
industrial. R. 362; 247, Tf 20. Directly across the street to the east and south is the
County's new adult detention center, the County's new "call center," and a new Sheriffs
substation, all authorized as conditional public uses in the A-l zone. Also located in the
area are a Youth Detention Center, and two facilities used by the Utah Transit Authority.
These new facilities are most compatible within a light industrial zone, and the zoning of
the area has been modified to reflect that, including the area on the east side of 900 West,
across the street from Statewide's property.
In an oversight, perhaps, but as a major inconsistency with its previous
practices, the County did not include the west side of 900 West in the new light industrial
zone. A review of the zoning map (R. 326) reveals that virtually every other street in the
South Salt Lake City area that is presently zoned for business or industrial use includes
such a designation for both sides of the street. The west side of 900 West appears to be
perhaps the only exception to this practice. However, this is not the only example of the
arbitrary, capricious nature of the City's decision to deny Statewide's rezoning
application.
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The Planning and Zoning Commission voted to recommend denial (R. 128)
of the application on four grounds: (1) rezoning would not conform to the General Plan
(although the area is surrounded on three sides by light industrial and business zones (R.
247,120; 326)); (2) rezoning would amount to spot zoning (although it is actually the
small patch of agricultural property in the midst of a sea of business and industrial usages
that constitutes the spot zoning (R. 324)); (3) the city should retain the remaining
agricultural land in its boundaries as agricultural (although none of the property located
along 900 West is presently being used as agricultural land (R. 324), the typical zoning in
the City includes the properties lining both sides of the City's streets (R. 326)~so that
only the property actually located directly behind Statewide's property is actual
agricultural in nature, which would not be affected by Statewide's request for rezoning of
the frontage property); and (4) two-thirds of the City contains other property zoned to
permit a bail-bonding business (ignoring the fact that the County's new adult detention
center is located directly across the street from Statewide's property (R. 324) and it is to
the public's general good that bail bonding businesses be proximate to detention
facilities).
Since Salt Lake County built a correctional facility in the area, relocated
other law-enforcement activities in the area, and issued a license to Statewide's bailbonding company, the character of that area was clearly envisioned by the County to be
appropriate for bail-bonding activities and, accordingly, subject to rezoning to permit the
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same, all of which gives rise to an arguable position that the City's position should be (or
might ought to be) the same. The very fact that the City's position is not the same
provides prima facie evidence that its decision was not based upon the evidence of the
actual usage of the area, with an eye to the ongoing development and future expansion of
the County's facilities, with appropriate accessory activities, so that the City's position
was clearly not based upon the evidence.
Although the City is entitled to use its discretion in its choice of land use, it
is not entitled to infringe upon the rights of citizens who made life-affecting decisions
based upon the County's avowed position. The City's discretion must be reasonably
related to serving the public health, safety or general welfare. "If a land use restriction is
unreasonable or irrational, it may be found to violate the substantive component of the
due process clause." 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, § 3 A.04
(4th ed. 1996), as cited in Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). Since the County (with its century-long jurisdiction over the area, its
studies finding the area to be the proper situs for the detention facilities and other
correctional activities, and its verbal encouragement to bail-bonding companies to
relocate nearby) found Statewide's use of its property as a bail-bonding company to be
reasonable and rational, the City's countermanding of the County must be seen as
unreasonable and irrational or, in other words, arbitrary and capricious.
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The City refers to opposition of owners of agricultural property in the area,
but fails to distinguish between those property owners residing along 900 Westcontiguous to the light industrial zone—and those along 1000 West who are the only
persons actually engaging in agricultural activities in the neighborhood. Even if the 900
West residents opposed the zoning change (which they did not), a property owner
has no vested right to "continuity of zoning...." A person who purchases land in
reliance upon its current zoning restrictions acquires no right that the restrictions
remain the same.
Young, op cit., § 4.28, at 325, 327 (4th ed. 1996), as cited in Smith, loc. cit.
As stated above, this area is clearly one whose character has materially
changed and was materially changed prior to its annexation by South Salt Lake, with the
huge building activity that is ongoing even to date, and to not have the area zoned in
conformity with the reality of what exists (but rather to create an arbitrary zone, ignoring
the reality of what exists) is again spot zoning and constitutes an arbitrary and capricious
decision.
The City rightly stated in its memorandum the holding in CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass % Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., (545 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah
1976)), that spot zoning consists of a smaller area being singled out of a larger area and
specially zoned for a classification totally different from that of the surrounding land.
What the City has ignored, however, is that the surrounding land on three sides is
commercial or light industrial in usage (R. 324, 326), and is presently becoming even
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more developed, so that leaving the west side of 900 West with an agricultural
designation is causing the actual spot zoning. It is not Statewide's property that is the
incongruity; it is the small strip of five houses along the west side of 900 West that stand
out as the last vestige of an older agrarian use that has ceased to exist along that street-a
spot of former agricultural use in a sea of commerce.
Additionally, the City's denial of the zoning request also did not properly
consider the general welfare of the residents of the area: Prisoners are let out of the
detention center at all hours of the day and night, being left to walk up and down the
street. Such a situation is better for a commercial establishment than for homeowners,
event Ty Webber is both. From the concept of protecting a family,
bonded prisoners would be better not walking through a neighborhood of homeowners
but through a neighborhood of bail bondsmen.
Another aspect of the public's general welfare concerns the constitutional
entitlement of arrestees to be released from incarceration through the posting of bond. It
is appropriate for this bonding/bailing activity to take place proximate to the jail (as was
clearly evidenced by the location of bonding businesses near the old Salt Lake County
Jail in downtown Salt Lake City), and it is obviously more convenient for family
members or other interested parties to be able to make bail arrangements in facilities
located close to the detention center.
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CONCLUSTON
Salt Lake County acknowledged the operation of Statewide's business as
appropriate, proper, and legal in its present location, and its approval gave Statewide a
grandfathered status. For the City to decide otherwise is arbitrary and capricious, and its
manner of conveying its decision was illegal and did not conform to its own statutes,
making the decision invalid.

DATED this ?$

day of August, 2001.

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by
depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed
to:

H. Craig Hall
South Salt Lake City Attorney
220 East Morris Avenue
South Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Dennis C. Ferguson
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
on this lp day of August, 2001.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1
§ 10-9-408, Utah Code Annotated

§ 10-9-408, Utah Code Annotated
10-9-408.
Nonconforming uses and structures.
(1)
(a)
Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or
structure may be continued.
(b)
A nonconforming use may be extended through the same
building, provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or
made for the purpose of the extension.
(c)
For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy
device to a building is not a structural alteration.
(2)
The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or
amendment for:
(a)
the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension,
alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance;
(b)
the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards,
by providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use, if any; and
(c)
the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by
acquiring the billboard and associated properly rights through:

(i)

gift;

(ii)
purchase;
(iii) agreement;
(iv) exchange; or
(v)
eminent domain.
(3)
If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining,
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or
vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent
domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v).
(4)
Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may
remove a billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner
with reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the
legislative body finds that:
(a)
the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or
misleading statement in his application;
(b)
the billboard is unsafe;
(c)
the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or
(d)
the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months.
(5)
A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school
district property when the property ceases to be used for school district purposes.

ADDENDUM 2
§ 19.48.010, etseq., Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance

19.4S.010

Chapter 19.48

1992; 1986 Recodification; § 1 (pan) of Ord. passed
2/1/84; prior code § 22-23-2)

A-l AGRICULTURAL ZONE
Sections:
19.48.010
19.48.020
19.48.030
19.48.040
19.48.050
19.48.060
19.48.070
19.48.080
19.48.090

Purpose of provisions.
Permitted uses.
Conditional uses.
Lot area.
Lot •widthFront yard.
Side yardRear yard.
Building height.

19.48.010
Purpose of provisions.
The purpose of the A-1 zone is to provide areas
in the county for low-density residential development, together with limited agricultural uses. (Prior
code § 22-23-1)
19.48.020
Permitted uses.
Permitted uses in the A-l zone include:
— Accessory uses and buildings customarily
incidental to permitted uses;
— Agriculture;
— Animals and fowl for family food production;
— Apiary;
— Aviary;
— Farm devoted to the raising and marketing,
on a commercial scale, of chickens, turkeys or other
fowl or poultry, rabbits, chinchilla, beaver, nutria,
fish or frogs;
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section
19.04.293;
— Household pets;
— Raising and grazing of horses, cattle, sheep
or goals, provided that such raising or grazing is not
a pan of, nor conducted in conjunction with, any
livestock feedyard, livestock sales yard, animal
byproduct business, or commercialridingacademy;
— Residential facility for elderly persons;
— Single-family dwelling;
— Worm farming (minimum lot area one acre).
(Ord. 1200 § 5 (part), 1992; Ord. 1179 § 5 (part),

19.48.030
Conditional uses.
Conditional uses in the A-l zone include:
— Airport;
— Bed and breakfast homestay;
— Campgrounds;
— Cemetery;
— Day care/preschool center, subject to Section
19.76.260 of this title;
— Dwelling group.
A. The parcel of ground on which the dwelling
group, as defined in Section 19.04.190 of this title,
is to be erected shall have an area equal to the aggregate of the minimum lot areas otherwise required
in fiie zone for the number of individual dwelling
structures in the group.
B. The distance between the principal buildings
shall be equal to the total side yards required in the
zone; provided, however, thai at the option of the
developer, the distance between the principal structures may be reduced to ten feet, provided that the
difference between ten feet and the required side
yards is maintained as permanently landscaped open
space elsewhere on the site. The distance between
principal buildings and the nearest perimeter lot line
shall not be less than fifteen feet unless demonstrated by the development plan that the yard required
for a principal building in the district in which located is more appropriate. The distance between the
building and a public street shall be not less than the
front yard required in the zoning district, except for
comer lots the side yard which faces on a public
street shall be not less than twenty feet.
C. Access shall be provided by a private street
or right-of-way from a public street; the private
street or right-of-way shall not be less than twenty
feet wide for one or two rear dwelling units and not
less than thirty feet wide for three or more dwelling
units.
D. A minimum of two parking spaces shall be
provided for each dwelling unit. Parking spaces and
vehicular maneuvering areas shall be designed to
comply with county standards.

iy.4s.u.ju

E. Every dwelling in the dwelling group shall be
within sixty feet of an access roadway or drive.
F. The development plan shall provide a buffer
landscaped area along all property lines and decorative landscaping adjacent to the buildings in appropriate locations. Solid visual bairier fences shall be
provided along all property lines unless the planning
commission approves otherwise by deleting or modifying the fence requirement
G. The development shall be approved by the
development services director and the county fire
chief before final approval is given by the planning
commission.
— Fruit and/or vegerihle stand, provided thai the
products aie produced on the premises;
— Golf course;
— Home day care/preschool, subject to Section
19.04293;
— Home occupation;
— Milk processing and sale, provided that at
least fifty percent of the milk processed or sold is
produced on the premises;
— Nursery and/or greenhouse, excluding retail
sales;
— Nursing home;
— Pigeons, subject to city-county health department health regulations;
— Planned unit development;
— Plant for storage or packing of fiuit or vegetables produced on the premises;
— Private educational institution having an
academic curriculum sinTifar to thaf ordinarily given
in public schools;
— Private nonprofit recreational grounds and
facilities;
— Public and quasi-public uses;
— Radio and television transmitting and relay
station and tower, excluding business office or studio, except such control room studio facilities as
required for emergency broadcasts in the event of
a national or local disaster;
— Residential health care facility for up to five
residents on streets less than eighty feet in width,
and up to ten residents on street eighty feet and
wider, excluding the facility operator and his/her
(Sab L^e Cooaty 1-96)
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related family with a maximum of one nonresident
pan-time relief employee on the premises at any one
time unless additional staffing is required by the
Utah Department of Health, which use shall not
change the residential appearance and character of
the property;
— Sportsman's kennel (minimum lot area one
acre);
— Temporary buildings for uses incidental to
construction work, which buildings must be re•moved upon completion or abandonment of the
construction work. If such buildings are not removed within ninety days upon completion of construction and thirty days after notice, the buildings
will be removed by the county at the expense of the
owner;
— Two-family dwelling. (Ori 1338 § 2 (pan),
1996; Ord. 1198 § 8 (pan), 1992; Ord. 1179 § 6
(pan), 1992; Ord. 1170 §§ 2 (pan), 3 (pan), 1991;
Ord. 1118 § 5 (pan), 1990; Ord. 1088 § 5 (pan),
1989; (pan) of Ord passed 12/15/82; Ord passed
11/17/82; prior code § 22-23-3)
19.4&040
Lot area.
In the A-l zone, the minimum lot area for any
dwelling, school, church, greenhouse, aviary or
apiary, or for the keeping of animals and fowl for
family food production, shall be ten thousand square
feet. The minimum lot area for any fowl, poultry,
rabbit, fish, chinchilla, beaver, nutria or frog farm,
or for raising or grazing horses, cattle, sheep or
goats (except as permitted for family food production), or for packing or storage plants, shall be one
acre. The minimum lot area for radio and television
transmitting and relay stations and towers shall be
four acres or more, such additional area to be sufficient to pennit the placement of towers in such a
manner that side clearance in every direction from
each and every tower shall be equal to or greater
than the height of the tower. (Prior code § 22-23-4)
19,48-050
Lot width.
In the A-l zone, the minimum width of any lot
which is required by this chapter to contain a minimum area of ten thousand square feet shall be

19.48.050

sixty-five feeL The minimuin width of any lot which
is required by this chapter to contain a minimum
area of one acre shall be one hundred fesL The
minimum width of any lot which is required by this

ADDENDUM 3
§ 5.02.170, South Salt Lake City Ordinances

5.02.160

C. The business license official shall have the
authority, on his or her own initiative, or in response to complaints from the public or any city
departments, to investigate and gather evidence of
violations of this code, or other circumstances which
may give rise to a denial, suspension or revocation.
Upon a finding that the business license application,
or business license, may be denied, suspended or
revoked for the reasons set forth above, the business
license official may deny, suspend, or revoke such
application or license. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A
(pan)))
5.02-170

Notice of denial, suspension or
revocation.
Upon a denial, suspension or revocation of a
business license application or business license, the
business license official shall cause written notice
to be given by personal service or registered mail to
the applicant or licensee of his or her decision to
deny, suspend or revoke an application or license.
Such notice shall include the reasons for the denial,
suspension or revocation of such application or license, and shall include any accompanying documentation relating to the business license official's
decision to deny, revoke or suspend an application
or business license. Such notice shall also include
a description, if applicable, of the applicant's or
licensee's right to appeal the decision of the business license official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part)))
5.02,180
Business license hearing board.
There is created a business license hearing board
of the city of South Salt Lake which shall consist of
three members, and such alternates as deemed appropriate, appointed by the mayor, with the advice
and consent of the city council. The board shall
consist of one member of the city council, one
resident of the city of South Salt Lake, and one
holder of a business license, or one having substantial interest in a business license issued by the city
of South Salt Lake, who is not a party to an appeal.
Members of the South Salt Lake business license
hearing board shall be appointed for two-year terms
or until their successors are appointed, and shall
AAS

serve without compensation. Upon an initial appointment by the mayor, with the advice and consent of the city council, one board member, as directed by the mayor, shall serve for a one-year term.
Thereafter, each appointment shall be for two years
for each member of the board. The business license
hearing board shall have the authority to hear evidence and business license matters referred to the
board, and after such hearing, shall submit its recommendations in writing to the office of the mayor.
The mayor shall designate one member of the board
to be chairman and one member of the board to be
vice chairman for a period of one year. (Ord. 97-23
§ 1 (Att. A (part)))
5.02.190
Procedures for appeal.
A. A person may appeal a decision of the business license official to deny, suspend or revoke a
business license by filing written notice of appeal,
directed to the business license hearing board, and
filed with the city recorder, within ten working days
of the date of the business license official's notice
to deny, suspend or revoke the business license
application or business license.
B. The notice of appeal shall be in writing, and
shall set forth specifically the grounds and reasons
why the business license application or business
license should not be denied, suspended or revoked.
(Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (pan)))
5.02.200
Business license hearing.
A. The hearing shall be a time, place and date
set by the business license hearing board, but not
later than ten working days following receipt of the
applicant's or licensee's notice of appeal.
B. The business license official, or his or her
representative or attorney, shall first present any
evidence upon which the business license official's
decision to deny, suspend or revoke an applicant's
or licensee's application or business license was
based.
1. The applicant or licensee, in person or
through his or her attorney, may then present any
evidence which shows the business license official's
decision was in error.
(City of South Salt Lake 4^g)

2. All witnesses shall be sworn to testify truthUy, and either party is entitled to confront and
oss examine any witnesses.
3. All evidence shall be recorded by a certified
>urt reporter and constitute a record of proceedings
' the business license hearing board.
C. The laws and ordinances of the city of South
lit Lake, the state of Utah and the United Slates
iall in all appeals be controlling. The business
:ense hearing board shall not make any findings
hich would result in the violation of, or continuing
olation of, any of the above laws and ordinances,
le business license hearing board shall not have
e authority to waive compliance with any of the
jplicable provisions of the business license ordimce, nor can the business \1c2nse hearing board
:tend deadlines set forth in such ordinances or
lange the substance or form of such ordinances.
)rd. 97-23 § 1 (Art. A (pan)))
02.210

Business license hearing board
decision.
Tne business license hearing board, after receivg all evidence presented by all parties, shall render
decision to either uphold the denial, revocation or
spension of a business license application or busies license within seven days from the date of such
taring. Such decision shall be in writing, and shall
elude the findings of fact and conclusions by the
isiness license hearing board. The business license
taring board may direct a prevailing party to draft
ich findings of fact and conclusions, and also relire an order to accompany such findings of fact
id conclusions. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part)))
02.220

Appeal of business license hearing
board decision.
Any decision of the business license hearing
)ard may be appealed by the applicant, licensee or
e city to the third district court within thirty (30)
Lys from the date the business license hearing
)ard submits its written decision. (Ord. 97-23 § 1
^tL A (part)))

ry of Sou6 Silt aice 4/33)
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5.02.230

Unlawful to engage in business
after revocation.
If any license shall be revoked or application for
license be denied as provided in this tide, it shall
thereafter be unlawful for any person to open, operate, maintain, manage or conduct any business,
trade, profession or calling for which a license is
required at the premises where the license was revoked or denied until a new license shall be granted
by the city. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part)))
5.02.240

Issuance of new license after
denial or revocation—Waiting
period.
No person who has been denied a license or
whose license has been revoked, and no person
associated or connected with such a person in the
conduct of his business, shall be granted a new
license until a period of six months after such denial
or revocation has elapsed except with approval of
the business license official. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (An.
A (part)))
5.02.250

Subject to general licensing
provisions.
The licenses required in the consolidated fee
schedule are specifically subject to all of the general
licensing provisions as set forth in this title. (Ord.
97-23 § 1 (Att. A (part)))
5.02.260
Fees required not additional.
The fees required under this chapter are not in
addition to other fees required in this title; only one
license is required for each business, except as set
forth in Section 5.02.020 providing for late penalties
on all licenses. It is realized that many of the businesses paying a license under this chapter are controlled and regulated by the state of Utah and Salt
Lake County, and insofar as the state and the county
require additional licenses or inspection fees, the
fees required hereunder are in addition to such fees
and are not in lieu thereof. (Ord. 97-23 § 1 (AtL A
(part)))

ADDENDUM 4
Letter of Russell Lawson, dated February 29, 2000

Salt Lake County Public Works Department
Planning and Development Services Division
Mary Callaghan, Commissioner
J. D. Johnson, Department Director

SALT LUKE COUNTY

Calvin K. Schneller, A.I.C.R, Division Director
SALT LAKE COUNTY
GOVERNMENT CENTER
2001 S. State Street
Suite N3600

February 29, 2000
J

To Whom it Mav Concern:

SaltUkeCity

Utah 84190-4200
Tei (801)468-2000
Fax (801)468-2169

The business license for Statewide Bail Bonds became effective on July 23, 1998.
The business license was not printed until November 4, 1998 due to problems incurred during
converting from one computer program to another. As far as Salt Lake County is concerned.
Statewide Bail Bonds was legally conducting business in Salt lake county in July, 1998.
If you have any farther questions, please contact our office.

[Utd^faF&iMi^
RUSSELL LAWSON, MANAGER

ADDENDUM 5
Affidavit of Russell Lawson, dated May 5, 2000

RANDALL T. GAITHER (#1141)
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)531-1990
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535)
440 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone. (801)466-6311
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL LAWSON

TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE,
BAIL BONDS
Plaintiff,

;

CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,

)1

Case No 000901508

)

Hon William B Bohling

Defendant.

The undersigned, Russell Lawson, being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows:
1 I am the Manager of the Salt Lake County Public Works Department, Planning and
Development Services Division, located at 2001 South State Street, Suite N-3600, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.1 am personally aware of the facts in relation to the application of Statewide Bail Bonds
for a business license at the location of 3350 South 900 West, South Salt Lake City,
Utah(account number 37430).

3. When the application for the business license was received at Salt Lake County, the
application as part of the standard procedure was submitted to the Zoning Department and
Zoning checked the application and the license and business use set forth in the license was
approved for Statewide Bail Bonds at the above referenced address under Salt Lake County
Zoning regulations.
4. If the business use did not comply with the zoning for the real property, then Zoning
would have not approved the business license at the site. Therefore under Salt Lake County's
interpretation of the zoning ordinances that existed in July 1998, the business use of Statewide
Bail Bonds was a lawful use which Salt Lake County specifically approved.
5. After annexation all the original files including the application and all business licenses
were forwarded to South Salt Lake City in order that they would be aware of the licenses that had
been issued by the County.
6. I am aware of other annexations in Salt Lake County by other cities such as
Taylorsville, and after annexations, the licenses from the County have been honored by the new
municipality.
DATED this ^Mjj

day of May, 2000.

RUSSELL LAWSON

2

State of Utah

)

:ss
County of Salt Lake )
On the

day of May, 2000, personally appeared before me Russell Lawson

who having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true
accordmg to the best of information and belief and has executed the same.
fcPTARY PUBLIC
KATMNAYUKOH-EKE
X
V; 2001 So State #N-3600
;:) Salt Lake Crty UT 84190
*y My Commission Expires
'
January 28 2001
STATE OF UTAH

Notary Seal:

3

ADDENDUM 6
Condensed Transcript/Index of Deposition of
Russell Lawson, dated September 15,2000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY WEBBER AND STATEWIDE
BAIL BONDS,
PLAINTIFF,

)
CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT/INDEX
)
CASE NO. 000901508

VS.
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
DEFENDANTS.

)
)

DEPOSITION OF RUSSELL L. LAWSON
TAKEN; SEPTEMBER 15, 2 000

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5980 South Fashion Blvd.
Murray, Utah 84107
263-1396
File No. 91500
REPORTED BY:
KELLY SOMMERVILLE, RPR

Condenselt
Page 2
Deposition of RUSSELL L. LAWSON, taken on behalf of

1

Page
Salt Lake City, Utah, September 15, 2000, 8:30 a.m.

Plaintiff, at the law offices of WILLIAMS & HUNT, 257

2
East 200 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah, on

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

September 15, 2000, commencing at 8:30 a.m., before
KELLY SOMMERVILLE, Registered Professional Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant to
Notice.

9
APPEARANCES:
10
11
12

FCR THE PLAINTIFF:

BY: WILLIAM B. PARSONS III, ESQ.
440 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

BY: H. CRAIG HALL, ESQ.
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY
220 East Morris Avenue, #200
South Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

13
14
15
16
17

WILLIAMS & HUNT
BY: DENNIS C. FERGUSON, ESQ.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

18
19
20

FOR MR. LAWSON:

BY: RENA BECKSTEAD, ESQ.
DEPUTY SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

ALSO PRESENT:

TY WEBBER

21
22
23
24
25

BY MR. PARSONS:

Q. Mr. Lawson, I'm the attorney for Mr. Webber
here, and we have an action pending against South Salt
Lake relative to a zoning issue. It doesn't involve
Salt Lake County, other than the fact that it used to be
property that was in Salt Lake County. And you may or
may not have some knowledge that would be relevant to m>
litigation, so I've asked to be able to interview you
this morning.
A. Okay.
Q. In this deposition, the young lady to my right
will take your responses down. She does that by keying
this machine and she can't do that very well if I speak
over the top of you or if you answer a question before
I'm through asking it, so we'll try hard, I hope, to
stay away from one another's words.
A. Okay.
Q. If you have a question about anything that I'm
asking you at any point during the course of the
deposition, don't hesitate to ask me. I have a bad
habit of asking awkward questions, so if I do that, just
let me know and I'll rephrase the question. If you need
to speak to your counsel or you need to take a break or
if there are any problems at any point in time, I have
Page
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WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY
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Russell Lawson

Mr. Parsons
Mr. Hall
Mr. Parsons
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EXHIBITS:
7
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No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Affidavit
SV-MISC Licence Application
Busxness Card for Linda Kingsley
Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance
Business License
Letter Dated 2/29/00
Salt Lake County Zoning Map
Salt Lake County Business License
Application
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12
16
17
18
20

21
26

14
15
16

no objection. That's perfectly okay with me.
The record is something I will be using during the
course of my proceedings so it's very important I have a
clear record. Accordingly, I would ask you not nod your
head one way or the other, but say yes or no if those
answers are appropriate and speak loud because I'm
getting old and I'm hard of hearing. Now, that's about
all that I have. Do you have any questions?
A. No questions.
Q. Great. Now, Mr. Lawson, I need to have you
raise your right hand and be sworn in.
(Whereupon witness was sworn.)
RUSSELL L. LAWSON,

having been duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
BY MR. PARSONS:

17
Q. Mr. Lawson, would you please tell me your full
18 name?
19
A. Russell L. Lawson.
20
Q. The middle initial was what?
21
A. Lee.
22
Q. Mr. Lawson, what is your business address, sir?
23
A. 2001 South State Street, Suite N3600.
24
Q. N3600. Okay. And your business telephone
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Page 6
Page 8
A. 468-2174.
1
Q. Can you tell me when that account number was
Q. For whom do you work, sir?
2 assigned?
A. Salt Lake County Development Services.
3
A. July 23, 1998.
Q. And is that part of the Public Works
4
Q. What is the procedure, if you'd be so kind,
Department?
5 explain that to me, sir, when a person seeks to have a
A. It is.
6 business license acquired.
Q. What is your position there?
7
A. Well, in this case, with this particular
A. I'm a business license manager.
8 business, they come into the County, ask to apply for a
(Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
9 business license. We ask them what is the location that
BY MR. PARSONS:
10 they gonna do their business in. We in fact check our
Q. Mr. Lawson, I want you to look at what has been 11 maps to make sure they're in the county. Once we find
marked as Exhibit No. 1 to this deposition, and ask if
12 out they're in the county and what zone it is, we ask
you can identify that document?
13 them what they are planning on doing, and they tell us
MR. FERGUSON: what is Exhibit 1, Brad?
14 what they are planning on doing and it may need a
MR. PARSONS: The affidavit of Russell Lawson.
15 conditional use or we can sign off on it.
MR. FERGUSON: Okay.
16
In this particular case, it was in an A1 zone. He
THE WITNESS: I recognize it, yes.
17 wanted to be doing a bail bond business with no
18 customers or employees coming to the home. So,
BY MR. PARSONS:
19 therefore, we gave him a business license application, a
Q. Is that your signature on the second page, sir?
A. It is.
20 phone and mail permit, which he said, and filled both of
Q. Did you read and understand the contents of
21 them out, the business license application is just a
Exhibit 1 before signing the same?
22 standard application. He put down his business, the
A. I understood them.
23 date he wanted to start operating it, the location of
Q. And are the representations contained in
24 it, any employees and stuff like that, d/b/a, owner's
Exhibit 1 true and accurate to the best of your
25 name, owner's address and etc. He filled that out and
Page 9

Page 7
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knowledge?
A. It's true.
Q. Exhibit 1 speaks in terms of an application for
a business license for Statewide Bail Bonds at a
location of 3350 South 900 West in what was at the time
of the application Salt Lake County. Do you recall any
of the events surrounding that?
A. Other than just it come across my desk, that's
about it.
Q. Okay. There's an account No. 37430 in
reference to paragraph 2 of the affidavit. What does
that account number refer to?
A. That referred to the business license account
we assign once it's finished.
Q. Is that a number you participate in assigning
or someone on your staff?
A. Someone on my staff.
Q. Very well. Does that account number refer to
in fact Statewide Bail Bonds?
A. It does.
Q. Have you reviewed that to determine that that
account number is accurately the one that pertains to
Statewide Bail Bond?
A. At the time it was assigned to Salt Lake County
it was.
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he signed that.
The phone and mail application that he filled out
was basically - I've got a copy of that. It's this
application. It would state that the business is
conducted in the home by a phone and/or mail. We asked
him, Was it his home? He said it was, so, therefore,
with a phone and mail — with a phone and mail, there is
no customer or employees coming to the home. No
vehicles, except the resident's own personal vehicle
transportation, equipment or merchandise stock, no
equipment or anything like that kept on the property.
The only thing that can really be maintained on a phone
and mail is just a desk, drafting table, home computer,
answering service device, fax machine, and printer. And
only the person residing in the home can be involved in
the business and no accessory buildings can be involved
on this permit.
If they abide by those rules, we have them sign this
application, zoning approve it, and then he brings it
back to us. We receipt it and issue him a receipt to
operate - start operating his business.
Q. In the instance of Statewide Bail Bonds, do you
know the date that the application was made?
A. Date the application was made was July 23,
1998. The date that they fill out the application and
T>~~~ £ _ D o ™ * O

Condenselt
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give it to us is the date that we enter into the
computer and that's the date we assign it as being a
current license
Q And so may I presume that on July 23 of 1998, a
business license application was made by Statewide Bail
Bonds to Salt Lake County?
A Correct
Q When was that approved7
A Normally we can staff approve licenses right
then and there As long as he agreed to abide by these
rule, the staff approves them Once we issue him a
license, they give him a receipt, we tell him he can
operate his business We, therefore, send it to the
County Commission for approval, and once the Commission
approve it, we go ahead and print the license In this
case, we probably didn't print a license because
approximately 15th of April we started a new Hansen
system And with that new Hansen system we started, we
had so much troubles, we was not able to print licenses
for some time
Q Computer system wasn't up witn you, I presume9
A It was a new system
Q And eventually did the license in this instance
get printed9
A I think it did

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

A Correct
Q All right Do you have, either through your
records or your personal knowledge, knowledge that m
fact Statewide Bail Bonds did make an application of
July 23, 19987
A Just going back, computer records is what we
have right here, that they did make application
Q So your computer records in fact verify the
application having been made, is that correct, sir7
A Right
Q But you don't have any hard copies beyond that7
A No
Q Okay Because of the transfer to South Salt
Lake7
A That's correct
Q Okay, thank you All right
(Exhibit No 2 was marked for identification )

18

BY MR PARSONS

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q Let me show you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No 2, sir, and ask you if you can
identify that document for me Take your time, look it
over
A This is actually just a copy that were printed
out from our computers saying that Statewide Bail Bonds,
the location, the account number that it was processed
Page 1
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Q But as ol 7/23 of '98, was there a business
license approved for Statewide Bail Bonds7
A I would say probably within two weeks after
that, because it takes about a week to put it to
Commission and then it's approved by Commission Phone
and mail businesses automatically approve
MR FERGUSON I'll object, speculative

8

BY MR PARSONS
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Q Do you happen to have any records relative to
the application of Statewide Bail Bonds7
A All records that we have pertaining to that
particular file were transferred to South Salt Lake
Q If I were to indicate to you that I had
previously been told by South Salt Lake that they didn't
have any records from Salt Lake County, would that be
surprising to you7
A I don't know All I know is when we - every
time that part of Salt Lake County annexed into another
jurisdiction, we automatically send that file to that
jurisdiction so they will have a history of that
business
Q So, theoretically, South Salt Lake ought to
have the historical record of the application of
Statewide Bail Bonds' business license application
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on, states it was processed on July 23 at 1407, the
issue date was 11/04/98 and expires 12/31/98
Q Relative to the process date of 7/23/98, does
that mean that's the date that the application was
submitted7
A Correct
Q And the issue date of 11/4, does that mean that
that is the date that the County Commission approved it 7
A No, that was probably the date that we
actually, as I said earlier, we had problems when we
started that new Hansen system, so we was having
difficulty pnnting We had a big, mass printing in
November, so we actually probably printed the hard copy
of that license on that day
MR FERGUSON objection again as to foundation
BY MR PARSONS
Q Okay, thank you Tell me, sir, speaking of
foundation, are you familiar with this instrument7
A Yes, this is the receipt
Q And is the receipt A Actually, it's just a reprint of that
particular file
Q From your computer system7
A From our computer system
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Page 14
County business records 7
1
A We don't - this is just - it's someone coming
2
in and asking for a reprint of what's on the account on
3
the record, then this is what this is.
4
Q This is what they would receive?
5
A Right
6
Q So this is somelhmg that was acquired from
7
someone from Salt Lake County?
8
A After the fact. This is not a receipt that we
9
would have gave him.
10
Q At the time 9
11
A At that time, that particular time.
12
Q I understand But this does show what your
13
computer records indicate in a hard copy form; is that
14
7
right, sir
15
A Correct
16
Q Relative to the 7/23/98 day, is that the day
17
that the business is entitled to go forward as though
118
they have a proper business license 9
19
A Yes, correct
20
Q If a business makes this application and they
21
have done what you have explained to me this morning 22
thus far, are they legally entitled to operate as a
23
business?
j 24
MR HALL objection, that calls for a legal
i 25
Page 15
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BY MR PARSONS

Q Please, sir
A Yes
Q Yes, sir, thank you Now, there's a
handwritten notation on the bottom of this form, can you
tell me what that notation says9
A It says "Apply for license 7/23/98, waiting
for software change, punt license License was" - I
can't make out what that was
Q Could that be valid9
A Yeah, "valid 7/23/98"
Q Do you recognize the initials beside that9
A That's Linda Kingsley
Q Is she an employee of your department9
A Yes, she is
Q Is she authorized to make such a notation9
A Right, that's our cashier and she receipted
this particular application
Q Kingsley, and by her initials on the bottom of
this indicating that the license was valid on 7/23/98,
would a property owner be entitled to presume that he
was operating legally from that point forward9
MR HALL Objection, calls for speculation, and he
can't speculate as to what the property owner can assume

Page 16
or expect
BY MR PARSONS
Q Well, I disagree entirely Please go ahead,
sir, that's something for the judge to decide
A The way our system is set up, when they pay
their fees at that particular time, unless it's a
commercial business dealing with alcohol or anything,
we, in this particular instance, we would tell a phone
and mail operator that he or she is entitled to operate
Q Is there anything on Exhibit 2 that would
indicate to you that Statewide's application for a
business license was handled out of the norm9
A No
Q To the contrary then, does Exhibit 2 indicate
to you that Statewide's business application was handled
the way you were handling all applications at that point
in tune?
A It was
(Exhibit No 3 was marked for identification )
BY MR PARSONS

Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as
Exhibit 3 to this deposition, sir, and ask you if you
can identify that Xeroxed copy of a business card9
A Yes
Q And who is that9

Page 17
1
A That's an employee of mine's, Linda Kingsley
2
Q Is that same individual whose initials appear
3 at the bottom of Exhibit No 2 9
4
A It is
5
Q And she was an employee of Salt Lake County
6 during the month of July of 19989
7
A That's correct
8
Q Thank you, sir
9
(Exhibit No 4 was marked for identification )
10

BY MR PARSONS
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Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No 4 and ask you if you can identify
that document
A It's the County Zoning Ordinance
Q How do you know that's part of your County's
Zoning Ordinance9
A It's marked Salt Lake County at the bottom but
we also deal with it every day
Q Do you recognize it personally9
A Yes
Q Great Relative to the County Zoning Ordinance
that is reflected by Deposition Exhibit 4, is this a
County Zoning Ordinance that Statewide Bail Bonds
operated under9
A Correct
Porro 14 - Parr** 17
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Page 18
Q Do the criteria for the operation of a home
occupation appear in Depo Exhibit No 4 9
A Not on the first page It would be on the
second page in the conditional use which is a home
occupation about midways down the page, item G
Q But for purposes of my deposition, may I
presume that I accurately state your position when I say
that Exhibit 4 to your deposition, this instrument I've
just handed you, is the Salt Lake County ordinance under
which Statewide Bail Bonds was given a zoning permit —
I mean a business license, is that right, sir'7
A That's correct
Q Thank you
(Exhibit No 5 was marked for identification )
BY MR PARSONS
Q I'm going to hand you what's been marked as
Deposition Exhibit No 5, sir, and ask you if you can
identify that document9
A It's a copy of the Salt Lake County business
license
Q And for whom is this business license issued9
A Statewide Bail Bondsman
Q Is this identified by an account number9
A It is
Q What is that account number9
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BY MR PARSONS
Q Any reason you know of at this point m time,
sir 9
A No
Q I appreciate the fact that you're relying on
your counsel, that's important, that's good Lots of
people don't
MR FERGUSON Depends on who the lawyer is In
this case, it's a good decision
MR PARSONS off the record
(Whereupon off-the-record discussion was held)
(Exhibit No 6 was marked for identification)
BY MR PARSONS
Q Let me show you what has been marked as
Deposition Exhibit 6, sir Do you recognize that
document 9
A Yes, I do
Q Did you write that document 9
A Yes, I did
Q And are the contents of that document true and
accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief7
A They are
Q Were you served with a subpoena duces tecum 9
A Yes, I was
Q Do you have any documents that you have brought
Page 21

Page 19
A 37430
Q 374309
A Right
Q And is that the same account number that
appears in your deposition, paragraph No 2, sir9
A It is
Q Is this the business license that is referenced
in Deposition Exhibit No 2 9
A It is
Q Thank you very much, sir When does that
license expire, by the way, according to its own terms9
A 31 December, 1998
Q 31 December of '98 9
A Right
Q Of'98 Good for six months9
A All our licenses expire the 31 st of December
every year
Q Every year, thank you
A Right
Q Is there any reason why that business license
would not have been renewed had this continued to be m
Salt Lake County9
MR FERGUSON Objection, speculation, insufficient
foundation
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with you
A Just the map that you requested
Q May I see it 9 Is this the Salt Lake County
zoning map that was in effect at the time that the
Statewide business application was made9
A It is
MR HALL Do you want to mark this9
MR PARSONS Yes We'll mark this as Deposition
Exhibit No 7
(Exhibit No 7 was marked for identification)
BY MR PARSONS
Q Tell me, sir, is the property addressed 3350
South 900 West, Salt Lake County, effective as of July
of 1998, located within the confines of this zoning map9
A Yes, they are
Q Would you identify for me what that zoning map
shows that zone to be 9
A Right here, Al zone
Q All right I have a red marker here Would
you mind putting a line around the zone that we have
just identified9 Put your initials by that, please,
sir And by that indication, you are telling us that
the area that you have marked on this map is the area
that was zoned Al that Mr Webber acquired a business
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Page 22
A That's correct
Q Thank you, sir Do you have any knowledge of
— knowledge personally of representations that were
made by South Salt Lake concerning the persons who
operated businesses m the annexed zone at the time of
the annexation of this particular property?
A No
MR HALL objection to the characterization of a
person of the City of South Salt Lake Be more
specific, Brad
MR PARSONS He has no knowledge, so we won't go
any further because he has no knowledge
MR HALL I didn' t hear that because I
interrupted
BY MR PARSONS
Q I appreciate the fact that there wasn't much
foundation for that question Relative to the zoning of
this particular property, did that zone change while the
property was still part of Salt Lake County between July
of 1998 and the time that it was annexed, which I will
represent to you was September 30 of '98?
A No
Q Okay Oh, let's review this map just for a
second here again Is this road immediately north of
this Al zone that you have here, is that 3300 South'?
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A That's 3300 South.
Q All right Is this A I'm not particularly sure whether it's north or
south of it
Q This is 3300 South?
A This is 3300 South.
Q Well, I think this is north
A Right.
Q So this would be south of 3300?
A So right m there
Q Right m there somewhere 7
A Right.
Q And are you familiar with the property itself
personally?
A No.
Q Okay
A I'm not.
Q Are you familiar with the construction of a new
jail complex and sheriffs administration complex by
Salt Lake County?
A No.
Q The zoning department didn't have anything to
do with the issues there?
A Not --1 couldn't answer that because I really
don't know
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MR PARSONS That's fine. That's all I have.
Thank you very much. I appreciate your time.
EXAMINATION
BY MR HALL
Q Mr. Lawson, my name is Craig Hall I'm a South
Salt Lake City Attorney. I'd like to ask you some
questions Let's go back to the business license
process itself. If a person wants to apply for a home
occupation, walk me through specifically step by step
what that individual would need to do.
A Basically what they would do is tell us what
they're going to do.
Q How would they tell you, orally or by written
application?
A Orally, if when you come m you say, I want to
apply for a business, we ask them, Where is it located?
Is it m your home? Is it commercial? If they say it's
in their home, we immediately go to the map and make
sure it is m the county We ask them, What are they
planing on doing? If they're having customers, making
anything, anything like that m the home, it have to go
through a conditional-use process. If they say they
just gonna ~ there's no customers or anything like that
coming to the home, then we go ahead and let them fill
out the appropriate paperwork, again, filling out the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

business license application, application for a phone
and mail, which stipulate six criteria they have to
make If they can meet those criteria, then the staff
can approve it there at the counter
Q Let me ask you a question If, according to
the County Zoning Ordinance, which was in fact allegedly
on July 23, '98, Exhibit No 4, is a home occupation a
conditional use?
A If they gonna start having customers and stuff
like that come out, it's home occupation and is
conditional use But in this particular case, because
there's no customers coming to the home, no employees
coming to the home, no stock or trade kept on the
property, the staff can sign that at the counter, we can
approve that
Q Is there a county ordinance that gives you that
authority or right?
A That's the - I won't say a county ordinance
perse It's a division policy
Q It's a division policy?
A Right
Q Despite the fact home occupation is listed as a
conditional use in the Al zone?
A Right
Q So by policy-

Condenselt1
1
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A -- we can approve that And that is why we
developed this particular form, if they gonna do
anything in their home other than just a phone, mail,
fax machine, that type, then they do have to go through
a conditional use process, which would be filling out
this application here, going to the community counsel,
notifying all the neighbors within 300 feet of the
particular business, and going to a planning commission
and a planning commission make the final recommendation
Q Okay When a person walks m and fills out
the — this form — and can we have this marked*? And I
don't know what number we're on, 7 or 8
(Exhibit No 8 was marked for identification )
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BY MR HALL
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Q When they fill out the form marked as
Deposition Exhibit No 8, does your department go out
and make an inspection of the premises where the license
is sought?
A No, not necessarily
Q Let's be particular-A No
Q -- in this case, regarding Statewide Bail
Bonds?
A Right
Q Did you or any member of your staff to your
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knowledge go visit the proposed location for Statewide
Bail Bonds?
A No
Q So you rely entirely upon the representations
of the applicant m the issuance of this license?
A Right But, see, we also rely on our maps
This is located m the home and it is an A1 zone and his
representation on here is saying that it's going to be a
phone and mail only If we go out and find out
otherwise, that's grounds for revocation and I do set up
a revocation to revoke the license based upon the zoning
violation
Q Is it illegal or not permissible under the home
occupation ordinance which would be applicable to
Statewide to have any signs or advertising on the
premises?
A Again, this here is what he signed to say
there's no signs, no advertising authorized unless he
comes back m and asked for a sign permit
Q Would that include signs on vehicles?
A We have no jurisdiction over signs on vehicles,
but on this here, it said only private vehicles is
allowed at the home
Q What about signs on a mailbox?

95
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does allow a small, like, a name plate sign on the door
for, say, delivery like for UPS
Q What about mailboxes in your opinion?
A In my opinion, I couldn't answer to that
because I'm not over sign ordinance
Q As a person authorized by the County to issue
these type of licenses, if a complainant came in and
said, John Doe, who's operating this home occupation,
has a great big sign on his mailbox advertising ABC
Company, would you approve it? Would you set up a
revocation hearing? What would you do?
A If he's got a sign, a big sign in his yard or
on his house saying that he's doing a business, it's not
authorized according to this, so what I would do, I
would send one of my land use inspectors out there to
leave him a note as to become compliant within X number
of days
Q What about advertisement on billboards that
says ABC Company at 1234 Elm Street, it's an off-premise
sign that refers to a home that has a home occupation?
A As long as he have no customers coming to his
home
Q Now, you're familiar with the area at Ninth
West and about 3500 South where Mr Webber's home is
located, and to where the business license was
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apparently issued It's immediately across the street
from the jail, the new jail facility
A Uh-huh
Q Did you have any concern when you issued this
license that he could not practically comply with the
requirement of no customers?
A Do I? Did we have? No, we didn't
Q So you were totally satisfied with the
representations that Mr Webber -- that he would never
have any customers walk across the street to his
business?
A Correct
Q He applied for the license on June — or excuse
me, on July 23, 1998 When did the County Commission
approve that license?
A I'd probably speculate again, it probably went
to the Commission within a week
Q Did you bnng any information or documents
today that would indicate when the County Commission
approved or denied or reviewed this?
A No, I didn't
Q Do you have any direct knowledge that they did
m fact consider this and approve it?
A Yes
O What is that knowledge based on and tell me
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about it.
A. Knowledge based upon commissioners meet twice a
week, Monday and Wednesday. At that particular time,
every Monday and Wednesday, I have my clerks go in and
fix out a list for business licenses to be processed and
approved by the commissioner for that given week. We do
this on a, I guess daily -- weekly basis, so it
wouldn't ~ his name would have probably came out within
probably -- the 23rd, depending on what day that was,
but his name would have came out the following
Commission meeting.
Q. Is that -- excuse me, is that based on your
normal operating procedure or direct knowledge that it
did in fact occur?
A. That's based upon our normal operating
procedures.
Q. So you have no direct knowledge that the Salt
Lake County Commission approved or denied this license?
A. No. But if I could go back and research the
record, then it would come out and say whatever the 23rd
was on, if it was on a Thursday, then it went to the
Commission that following Monday. If it was a Tuesday,
it went to Commission on that Wednesday of the following
week.
Q. Do you know when South Salt Lake effectively
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A. Repeat that again.
Q. Did any member of the County Commission, during
the application period around July 23, 1998, or soon
thereafter, approach you or your staff suggesting or
requesting that the license for Statewide Bail Bonds be
issued?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Okay. Let me be more direct. Did Commissioner
Brent Overson come to you and suggest that that
preferential treatment should be given Statewide Bail
Bonds — be given to Statewide Bail Bonds in their
application for a business license?
A. Not to me, no.
Q. To your knowledge, to any member of your staff?
A. No.
Q. Did somebody come to you in November and
request that this business license be issued in
November?
A. No.
Q. Why was it processed and issued in November?
A. Again, as I said earlier, we started a new
Hansen system.
Q. What is a Hansen system?
A. Okay. It's our software that we issue business
licenses in. We were on a Paradox system, so we decided
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annexed the property between 3300 South and 3900 South?
A. Our record indicates September 4, 1998.
Q. September 4?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know when that annexation was effective?
A. That's the date that they told us it was
effective, September 4, 1998.
Q. Referring to Deposition Exhibit No. 5, which
represents to be the business license, there's a date on
there that says issue date.
A. Correct.
Q. And what is that date?
A. That's dated November 4, 1998.
Q. Is that after the effective date of the
annexation?
A. Right. You want me to explain that date?
Q. No.
A. Okay.
Q. I've asked the question I wanted answered. Let
me ask you a very considerate question, a question that
I don't want you to take offense by, but I need to
know. Did a member of the County Commission come to
you, or to your knowledge, any member of your staff and
say that -- and direct you or suggest that a business
license for Statewide Bail Bonds be issued?
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to change systems. We came on-line with a new update
system out of Sacramento, California. When we came
on-line with that system from April to about October, we
could not ~ we did not print any hard copy business
license. We were having such a problem with it when we
had Sacramento come back in, worked on the process about
end of October or first part of November, we had a mass
printing, like we printed out something like about 8900 business license hard copies. Once they kicked out
of the computer system, then we automatically mail
these. This in particular was annexed into South Salt
Lake along with a bunch more, but they were already
flagged to be printed. So when they came out printed,
they had an issue date of 11/4/98. We did mail these
particular licenses to the applicant because they was
current at that particular time.
Q. Okay. Mr. Lawson, Linda Kingsley works for
you?
A. That's correct.
Q. Help me out on her scope of responsibility. I
thought I heard you say that she was a cashier?
A. Correct.
Q. Her business license card says she's a business
license specialist.
A. That's correct.
PSCTP
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A It was drafted by the county attorney I'm
assuming.
Q Do you want to confer with your client?
MS BECKSTEAD Please.
THE WITNESS Okay. It was drafted by his
attorney.
BY MR HALL
Q Did you modify, when you received it, did you
modify any of the language or just review it and sign
it?
A No, I had it reviewed.
Q And reviewed by whom?
A By Rena.
Q Were any changes made from the original draft
that was given to you 9
A Yes.
Q Were any changes made m paragraph 4 from the
original draft?
A I can't remember on that.
Q Do you know - do you remember any of the
changes that were made from the original draft to the
document that is now known as Exhibit No. 1 ?
A There was some changes made, but I just can't
remember what they was.
MR HALL okay. Thank you. I don't have any other

Page 40
l later date.
MS BECKSTEAD That's fine.
2
(Whereupon deposition was concluded.)
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1 questions Thank you, Mr Lawson

1

2
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FURTHER EXAMINATION

)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

3

3 BY MR PARSONS
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STATE OF UTAH

Q Just a second, Mr Lawson I'm going to have
to look just quickly here and see if anything has
arisen Mr Lawson, were there any complaints by
neighbors that would have facilitated an on-site
inspection by your staff?
A No
Q Relative to the questions concerning Mr
Overson, have you heard that Mr Overson thought that
bail bonds offices ought to be opposite the jail?
A I haven't heard anything
MR PARSONS Thank you That's all, sir Ms
Betkstead, could I get your telephone number?
MS BECKSTEAD 468-2650
MR PARSONS 2650?
MS BECKSTEAD Lh-huh
MR FERGUSON Here's what I'll do, let's put it on
the record we've stipulated that for purposes of our
summary judgment motion on Monday, assuming it goes
forward, that we can use the deposition transcripts
without signature As a courtesy to you folks, we'll
send you a copy anyway so you'll have a chance to review
i f f V i o f ' c ar\r\mr\r-i
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Reporter's Certificate

2 STATE OF UTAH
)
) ss.
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

5

I, KELLY SOMMERVILLE, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
6 do hereby certify:
7

That the deposition of RUSSELL L. LAWSON was
taken before me pursuant to Notice at the time and place
8 therein set forth, at which time the witness was by me
duly sworn to testify the truth;
9
That the testimony of the witness and all objections
10 made and all proceedings had at the time of the
examination were recorded stenographically by me and
11 were thereafter transcribed, and I hereby certify that
the foregoing deposition transcript is a full, true, and
12 correct record of my stenographic notes so taken;
13
I further certify that I am neither counsel for
nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise
14 interested in the outcome thereof.
15

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 16th day of
September, 2000.
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ADDENDUM 7
Transcript of the Court's Oral Decision, September 18,2000

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE
BAIL BONDS,
Case No. 000901508
Case No. 20001021-SC

Plaintiffs,

ORAL ARGUMENTS ON
COUNTER MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
Defendant.

(Videotape Proceedings')

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of
September, 2000, commencing at the hour of 10:06 a.m.,
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following videotape proceedings were had.
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS, III
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ALAN P SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA ORiVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:
South Salt Lake.

Statewide Bail Bonds vs. City of

Case No. 000901508.

Counsel, would you enter your appearances,
please?
MR. PARSONS:

William Parsons on behalf of

Statewide Bail Bonds, your Honor.
MR. FERGUSON:

Dennis Ferguson and Craig Hall on

behalf of the City of South Salt Lake.
THE COURT:
summary judgment.

All right.

We're here on motions for

Counsel?

MR. PARSONS:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Are you ready to proceed?

Yes.

MR. PARSONS:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. FERGUSON:

Your Honor, a question of the

Court to begin with, but there are some procedural motions
in terms of a motion to continue.

And I didn't know if

your Honor wanted to hear the argument on the merits of the
motion for summary judgment, or—because Mr. Hall's going
to handle that, I'm off the hook.
THE COURT:

I'll hear the arguments on the motion

to strike and motion to continue first, I probably ought to
deal with that initially.
MR. FERGUSON:

All right.

2

1

MR. PARSONS:

Your Honor, it's my motion to

2

strike and there's the second, my motion to continue

3

(inaudible).

4

We have supplemented memorandum in support of our

5

objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment

6

indicating that we felt that there were a number of

7

procedural errors in that process, your Honor.

8
9

I trust that the Court is in possession of the
same and has the opportunity of reviewing it.

I, frankly,

10

have not a great deal to add to that which we have written

11

down, the nature of the procedural errors that we find most

12

telling are the fact that the statement of facts that the

13

city has submitted in support of its motion for summary

14

judgment are not specifically supported by either affidavit

15

or references to the record; in other words, there are no

16

facts, there are only allegations that support the city's

17

motion for summary judgment.

18

As taken under the—the definitions of a Rule 56

19

and a Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Code of Judicial

20

Administration, there is not a con—there is no concise

21

statement that sets forth the factual allegations, again

22

referring to the record and for that reason, we believe

23

that their motion for summary judgment should be stricken.

24

The reason that I have asked for continuation of

25

this process is because we were in the process of engaging

3

1

in discovery.

2

conducting two of them this past Friday, one involving the

3

officer of Salt Lake County who issued the—whose office

4

issued the business license to Ty Webber in 19—in July of

5

1998 and one involving the city building inspector.

6

We set depositions in this matter, actually

There's at least one additional, if not two

7

additional depositions that will be required in that case

8

if ultimately, we are capable of at least finding the one

9

deponee, (sic) who is a prior employee of South Salt Lake

10

and an inspector.

11

Overson, Salt Lake County Commissioner.

12

capable of scheduling that with Mr. Overson, so we have not

13

noticed the same up.

14

And we require the deposition of Brent
We have not been

We have conducted preliminary—preliminary

15

discovery and frankly, at this particular point in time, if

16

the case—if the Court decides that it's appropriate for us

17

to proceed, I don't think that'll be greatly prejudiced but

18

I'd prefer to complete the discovery before the motions for

19

summary judgment are argued.

20

I might add that I've not been capable of picking

21

up my copies of the depositions that were conducted on

22

Friday as of this point in time.

23

yesterday, on Sunday, but I'm not sure about that and s o —

24

he's not here yet and I can't tell you.

25

I think my client did

That's all that I have relevant to the same.

4

1 I

THE COURT:

2 I

MR. PARSONS:

3

Thank you.
I'll reserve, of course, my

arguments.

4

Your Honor, I would procedurally suggest that if

5

it's appropriate for us to argue both of our motions for

6

summary judgment, that it might, time-wise, permit us some

7

judicial economy if we simply argue our own affirmative

8

motions because the affirmations that we make in our own

9

motions are effectively the counter-positions that we have

10

in the opposition's motion and our objections to their

11

motions.

12

Thank you, Judge.

13

THE COURT:

14

Mr. Ferguson?

15

MR. FERGUSON:

All right.

Thank you.

Your Honor, the—with regard to

16

the motion for a continuance, I—I guess I have two

17

problems.

18

issues of fact that—that they can't respond to a motion

19

for summary judgment until they discover, we proceed with

20

Rule 56(f) affidavits that lay out the discovery that's

21

desired and what the party thinks that discovery will

22

disclose.

23

Normally, i f — i f a party believes that there are

The plaintiff has not done that in this case.

I-

24

-I don't want to come in here and stand on procedure, b u t —

25

but t h i s — t h e — t h e only issue before this Court is a

5

1

petition to ask this Court to judicially overturn a

2

legislative zoning decision of the City of South Salt Lake,

3

That's the issue before this Court.

4

And it's our position and always has been that

5

with regard to that claim, that's—that's a claim on the

6

record, on the legislative record, which is—which is

7

clearly attached to and made a part of our memorandum.

8
9

Plaintiff, for some reason in this case, decided
to proceed on two tracks simultaneously.

One was to seek a

10

petition for review from this Court, the other was to file

11

a motion for—or a — a damage case that's pending before

12

Judge Lewis.

13

two different tracks on a — o n a case arising out of the

14

same essentially fact situation.

Made the decision t o — t o — t o go forward on

15

And what the plaintiff is claiming and their

16

motion for summary judgment in this case is really not

17

relevant to the petition because what they're saying is,

18

gee, we had a business license when we were—we were given

19

a business license by Salt Lake County and so even though

20

City of South Salt Lake has now annexed us, we're entitled

21

to be grandfathered in and we're entitled to a zoning

22

change based upon the business license that was granted us

23

b y — b y Salt Lake County.

24
25

And that—that issue or that argument may be, may
be relevant in the damage case pending before Judge Lewis,

6

1 I but it is not relevant to the Court's determination of the
2 I legislative decision made by the—by the City of South Salt
3 I Lake in no rezoning the plaintiff's property.

And that's

4

really the sole issue before, that we believe is before

5

this Court.

6

And if we focus on that issue, all of the other

7

procedural stuff in terms of wanting more discovery a n d —

8

and the argument over whether that—that's Mr. Parsons' own

9

fault for not proceeding more quickly and—and all of that

10
11

stuff i s — i s really not important.
We think what—what ought to occur here today is

12

to hear argument on our motion for summary judgment that

13

relate solely to the petition, to have this Court review

14

that legislative decision and argument on the motion for

15

summary judgment which does raise issue—issues of fact

16

that's been filed by the plaintiff.

17

this is not the appropriate forum for that.

IS

a consolidation down the road of these cases, that's

19

something that Judge Lewis would decide.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21 J

Anything further?
MR. PARSONS:

No.

It is not—is not a —
Unless there's

Thank you.

I'm prepared to go forward and

23 I argue my motion (inaudible)
24
25

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, what I'm going to

do, I'm going to deny the motion to continue and deny the

7

1

motion to strike.

Arguments of counsel for the defendant

2

were persuasive to the Court.

3

before me is not the sort o f — o f motion that would be

4

vulnerable to a motion to strike and I think o n — i n terms

5

of a continuance—on the motion to continuance—continue

6

the matter, again, what the Court believes it has before it

7

is what has—has been raised a s — a s the legislative

8

question and therefore, I think that this is a time—an

9

appropriate time to proceed on that.

I believe that what is

10

I'll hear your argument on the merits now.

11

MR. PARSONS:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Thanks, Judge.

Ready to go

forward.
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, I believe this is the

City's motion for summary judgment.
MR. PARSONS:

Well, we both have motions for

summary judgment pending.
THE COURT:

I'll let—well, you go ahead and

argue yours first.

19

MR. HALL:

Okay.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. PARSONS:

That's fine.
I don't know if this is the easiest

22

one to work with, Judge, but I need (inaudible) as to the

23

(inaudible)

24
25

By the way, I'll (inaudible)

Judge, the area that we are dealing with here is-was in the confines of the City of South Salt Lake.

8

The

1

City of South Salt Lake has in its southwestern corner an

2

area that is boundered—boundaried by the Jordan River on

3

the western side and then an arbitrary boundary across the

4

southern border.

5

The street that is designated 900 West runs

6

through this and that's 900 West that my pen is pointing at

7

right there.

8

zone is the area that we're dealing with and it is zoned A-

9

1, agricultural one, and this is this dark green zone up

10
11

And immediately below this Red B, this is A

here.
I have in my memorandum a—an exhibit, your

12

Honor, and I'd appreciate it if you'd refer to that, it's

13

Exhibit J, and Exhibit J is a color map that—this is

14

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

±5 I Judgment, your Honor.
16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PARSONS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PARSONS:

20
21

I'm—I'm looking for it.
Uh huh.

Thank you.

Okay.
I was working from my own copy.

Appreciate that.
T h e area t h a t is i m p a c t e d b y t h e m o t i o n for

22

s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , y o u r H o n o r , is b o u n d a r i e d by 3 3rd S o u t h

23

on the bottom of your page and that page runs in a

24

southerly direction towards the top of the page and the

25

southern boundary of the City of South Salt Lake is

1

approximately 3655 South.

2

900 West is shown in the center of that page and

3

the properties that we are asking to have the Court

4

consider the issue of zoning relative to is Statewide Bail

5

Bonds' property that is on the right-hand portion and it's

6

in a tan color, if the Court can see that,

7

THE COURT:

I see it.

8

MR. PARSONS:

9

It's important for you to understand factually

Thank you, your Honor.

10

the nature of the configuration of the property because

11

that's a central portion of the argument that we are

12

making.

13

Along 33rd South, your Honor, coming from the

14

east, we find a golf course to the north of 33rd South, a

15

convenience store on the corner, then a giant parking lot

16

with a Sam's Club, a very large retail organization,

17

wholesale-retail organization on the northwest corner of

18

the intersection of 33rd South.

19

On the south side of 33rd South, the block across

20

the street from Statewide Bail Bonds, we find Salt Lake

21

Valley GMC, as we approach from the east, a very large

22

parking lot and then the Salt lake County Sheriff's Office

23

in a very large building directly across the street.

24

then immediately south of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's

25

Office is the Salt Lake County Jail and another exceedingly

10

And

large building and—and south of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office is another very large parking lot and UTA
facility on both sides of 900 West, both sides of 900 West.
And then when you come from the north to the
south on the west side of that street, you'll find
properties that are numbered three, two and one and then
Statewide.

Three, two and one are all residences,

Statewide has two properties there and they're both
residences.

Of those five properties in line, three, two,

one and then the two for Statewide, four of those five are
owned by bail bonding companies.

The property on the

corner, Number Three is not, and I have furnished an
affidavit of Mr. Frederickson, but I will represent that he
has stood in—in meetings before South Salt Lake in
reference to the fact that he is not opposed to the
rezoning of the property.
Immediately south of Statewide is the brand new
call center for Salt Lake County, that's where the 9-1-1
calls are—go in come—go in and come out from.

And then

the—below that's, the jail command center, Salt Lake
Valley Youth Detention Center below that, and again, the
very large complex for UTA.
Behind that, you have farm ground.

When I say

behind it, I mean to the west of our property, to the west
o f — o f — o f the 1000 West.

You'll see that UTA, Salt Lake

11

1 I Valley Youth Detention Center and the 9-1-1 Center extend
2 | all the way in to 1000 West, but there are some farms along
3 f 1000 West, on the east side of that street.
4

There is a—there is another property that is

5

owned by a bail bondsman that is Number four, along the

6

south side of 3 3rd South and then Number five is a vacant

7

field and Number six is the Silver Bullet Lounge, it's a

8

beer joint, which has been there for a long, long time.

9

That's the nature of the property that we a r e —

10

that we are talking about, Judge.

11

argument that we are making is relatively simple.

12

argument is, is that at a given point in time, Salt Lake

13

County anticipated that it was appropriate to construct a

14

whole series of municipal facilities, the jail complex, the

15

9-1-1 center, the sheriff's office, the Youth Detention

16

Center and a whole bunch of other things down there,

17

exactly across the street from Mr. Webber's property.

18

The nature of the
That

Mr. Webber, in anticipation of a new jail going

19

in there and jail center and so forth, purchased that

20

property, as did a number of other bail bondsmen, purchased

21

property across the street from the jail, basically, as did

22 I a number of other bail bondsmen.
23 I

At the point in time that Mr. Webber bought his

24

properly (sic) he began immediately the process of

25

remodeling that property and then in July of 1998, in fact,
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on the 23rd day of July of 1998, Mr. Webber filled out an
appropriate application for a business license from Salt
Lake County.

That application was granted.

On this past Friday, we took the—the deposition
of the gentleman who runs the—the Department, Mr. Russell
Lawson, who gave that business license out.

And Mr. Lawson

verified, I will represent to you, although I do not have
the record available to me because the depo was just taken
Friday, and the reason it was just taken Friday is because
we couldn't work any other time out before the arguments.
Anyway, Mr. Larson (sic), I will represent to
you, indicated, just as his affidavit which is appended to
our motion for summary judgment so indicates, that the
business license application was in order by Ty Webber and
that the business license was granted effective July 23rd
of 1998.
In September of 1998, South Salt Lake City, or
the City of South Salt Lake, annexed the property that Mr.
Webber occupied.

It also annexed all of the property that

contained the call center, the Youth Detention Center, the
UTA facility and the jail complex and Sam's Club and the
golf course and GMC and so forth.

It annexed that whole

zone right down to 3600 South—or actually below that.
I—I misspoke when I said 3 6 was the southern
boundary.

It is not, it's just the southern boundary of
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that A-l zone, but it annexed property there.

I don't know

exactly where the annexation covered, but all of that was
zoned A-l at the time of the annexation.
Salt Lake County's A-l zoning, it is represented
by the documents submitted by the City of South Salt Lake,
is the same zoning, contains the same language, is the same
zoning ordinance as South Salt Lake's zoning ordinance
relative to A-l.

We have appended in our motion for

summary judgment a copy of Salt Lake County's ordinance for
A-l zoning.
We were, at the time that we acquired our
business license on July 23rd of 1998, doing business as a
home owner occupied business in the A-l zone, which South
Salt Lake has objected to and which Salt Lake County
indicated in—again, in Russell Lawson's deposition this
past Friday, was entirely appropriate; in other words, that
there was nothing wrong, as long as we meet all of the
criteria with doing business as a home occupied business.
There was no prohibition for bail bondsmen having a bail
bonding office in their home, living there, running their
bail bonding office, as long as they did it within certain
configurations an that is precisely what Mr. Ty Webber did.
He remodeled it, moved in, opened his business up
and did business there for a number of weeks, if not a
couple of months, let's see, August, September, eight,
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nine, approximately nine or ten weeks prior to the
annexation by South Salt Lake.
Now, the—the home occupation use that is
permitted by Salt Lake County was—was again verified by
the affidavit which is, I believe, Exhibit 4—no, C, pardon
me, to our memoranda, and—and Mr. Lawson indicated that
even though South Salt Lake may have treated an application
of that variety as a non-conforming use requiring a
hearing, Salt Lake County did not.

All that was required

was that Mr. Webber fill out the application, sign the
affidavit, pay the fee and he was capable of doing
business.
Now, it just so happened that Salt Lake County at
that particular point in time had changed computer systems
a few months earlier and they were incapable of actually
issuing the business license on that date.

They issued the

business license on November 4th of 1996, in a mass
printing, according to Mr. Lawson.

He indicated that there

were a number of hundreds of those business licenses that
were printed on that day.
He further indicated in his deposition that there
was nothing unusual about that, meaning that South Salt—
that Statewide Bail Bonding was not treated out of the
ordinary, that they were handled in the same methodology,
by the same—in the same manner that any other business
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would have been handled, who had made such an application
on that day and in fact, that is precisely what happened.
We—we learned in the course of the deposition
that the guidelines under A-l zoning do not speak
specifically of bail bonding organizations as being
permitted as home occupied—home occupation businesses, but
South—but Salt Lake County treats that as being
appropriate unless it is specifically denied.

Unless there

is a prohibitation in the license—check that, that in the
statute that would prohibit you from engaging in some kind
of business, they allow you the opportunity of going forth
and doing business.
I will point out to you that the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah has, on a number of occasions, reviewed
that issue and in Patterson vs. Utah County Board of
Adjustments f a 1995 case, I said Supreme Court, it's the
Court of Appeals.

The concept associated with whether or

not you should be permitted the opportunity of going
forward and—and doing business in the zone unless there
was a specific prohibitation to the contrary was affirmed,
specifically.

That case was affirmed subsequently by the

Utah Supreme Court in a 1999 decision entitled Springville
Citizens for a Better Community in the City of Springville
vs. the City of Springville.

Both of those cases are cited

and references provided in our memoranda.
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The—the nature of the—the nature of the
arguments that we make based upon those factual allegations
are as follows, your Honor:
arguments are twofold.

Basically, that—and—and the

Basically that Mr. Webber's

business, the Statewide Bail Bonding business was a legally
authorized business doing business in an appropriate zone
at the point in time that South Salt Lake annexed his
property.

And as such, they're grandfather, and nothing

more complex than that, by the way of the first
consideration, the first argument, the first point.
I presume that the Court would not require me, we
do cite in our memoranda the cases that support the
proposition that grandfathering is appropriate when a
business is doing business legally and the zoning is
changed, he's entitled to continue to do business until
such time as he effectively stops doing that business.
That's a relatively traditional law.

The English

common law is, is of course that you're entitled to do
business on your property regardless of what you're doing
until there's a specific—specific prohibitation by law and
that specific prohibitation would have to be justified in
the public interest.
That has been—that English common law has been
substantiated again in both the Springville and the
Patterson cases that I have referred to previously.
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That

is the law of the State of Utah at this particular point in
time.
And that gives rise to the second point of
interest or—or—or point that I wish you to consider and
that is, is that in addition to being grandfathered,
there's no exclusion.
zone.

He's appropriately in the right

He's not excluded from the language—by the language

of the statute and I might point out that South Salt Lake
has not amended this A-1 zoning or had not at that point in
time.

I believe they may subsequently have done so, but

they had not amended their A-1 zoning ordinance and—at the
point in time of the annexation, and at the point in time
of the annexation, there was no prohibitation for home
occupied business and in fact, they were specifically
granted and bail bonding companies were not specifically
prohibited as a home occupied business in the A-1 zoning
under South Salt Lake's zoning ordinances.
So, for the reason that we have a proper business
license at the time of the annexation, that we therefore
ought to be grandfathered and that we qualify under the A-1
zoning anyway, we suggest to you that it is appropriate to
force the City to permit us the opportunity of either
continuing to do business as a non-conforming use and grant
us a business license accordingly.

Or, in the alternative,

we have suggested that the actions of the City of South

18

Salt Lake constitute a reverse spot zone.
Now, the reason that we suggest that they
constitute a reverse spot zone is best understood when you
look at that little diagram that you have before you, your
Honor.

That diagram shows you quite clearly that what we

have along 900 West, when we are below 3 3rd South and above
3655 South, is a — a — a n area that is approximately threeand-a-half blocks long on two sides of the street,
containing—and I don't know whether you would consider it-I don't—you don't call the Salt Lake County Jail
commercial.

UTA may or may not be commercial, I frankly

don't know that, but it—we all know what UTA does, they
operate buses and they don't raise cows and pigs and
horses, nor does the Salt Lake County Jail, nor does the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office or GMC—Valley—Salt Lake
Valley GMC, nor does the 9-1-1 call center, the jail
command center, the Salt Lake Youth Detention Center.
And I might add, neither do Statewide Bail Bonds,
Hy & Mike's Bail Bonds or Beehive Bail Bonds, the owners of
properties listed as Statewide Bail Bonds, numbered one and
two and four on your map, along 900 West and 3 3rd South.
The gentleman there, who is Mr. Frederickson, on the
corner, Mr. Frederickson, as I've indicated, I haven't an
affidavit from him, he—he has not been willing to produce
one, he has indicated at this particular point that—that—
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he has indicated in public meetings that he has no
objection as long as he was able the opportunity to
continue to—to have animals until such time that his
property was sold.

He recognizes that the property is

prime commercial property and ultimately, that's what it
will be.
Now, when you consider the physical
characteristics and you look at the nature of that which
surrounds Statewide Bail Bonding, then you can clearly see
why we would suggest that there is in fact a reverse spot
zoning.
And the cases provide that, and we've cited you
to the cases in the memoranda.

Cases provide that—that

spot zoning involves the concept of an isolated piece of
ground being zoned differently from surrounding ground for
the benefit of those persons in that isolated zone.
Well, we only have Mr. Frederickson on the corner
along 900 West as it goes all the way from 33rd to 3655
that even remotely is agricultural in character and
everything else is other a business or vacant ground, one
vacant lot, a whole bunch of business people who want to be
in business, who aren't now because they haven't been
issued business licenses; but trust me, when I tell you
that Hy & Mike's Bail Bonds and Beehive Bail Bonds have
also appeared before the City of South Salt Lake and
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petitioned for a consideration of rezoning as well.
Now, it would make a tremendous amount of sense
for one to say, my goodness gracious, 900 West looks a
whole lot like it's an area that isn't going to in the
future, raise cows and pigs; but in the future, is in fact
going to operate as either quasi-public or commercial
ground.

And that's precisely what is occurring today

without the benefit of the rezoning.
Now, I admit, sir, that the zone that is A-l runs
from 900 West all the way over to the river along our side
of the road, all the way across the other side i s — i s — I
was about to say is light industrial.

It's not, your

Honor.
The—the map, if I understand it correctly, no,
that's correct.

Across the other side is light industrial,

this gray zone and we're here, if I—if I am looking at the
map correctly and Hy &—yes, I am.

Right here. This is

the Statewide property right at the end of my finger—I
know you can't see that from here, but you can see the
color differentiation and the A-l zone is the dark green
and the light industrial is this and this is business.
So, we are surrounded on three sides by either
light industrial or business zone and all the way down 900
West, which is this road that separates the two zones, all
the way up and down 900 West on both sides is the property
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that I have described.
For us to consider that—that the modification of
the Statewide Bail Bonding property and, for instance, Hy &
Mike's and Beehive Bail Bond and so forth, to accommodate
their business operations from A-l to whatever South Salt
Lake wants it to be in order to permit us the opportunity
of operating a bail bonding there would be selective zoning
for the benefit of the owners, is precisely the opposite.
The selective zoning has occurred by South Salt Lake in—in
prohibiting us from having the opera—the opportunity to
operate our businesses there when you have clearly either
commercial, industrial or quasi-public operations that
totally surround us and encompass all of the property that
we're seeking to have rezoned.
So, we have suggested that the decision of the
City Commission is arbitrary and capricious and that the
arbitrary and capricious decision is not substantiated by
any evidence and that since it is arbitrary and capricious
and not substantiated by any significant evidence, as is
required, I might add, by the specific language of the
Sprinaville Citizens case; since it is not substantiated or
is not substantiated by any significant evidence, that we
are entitled, as a matter of law, to have that rezoned
because their actions are again, arbitrary and capricious.
Now, in order to substantiate your entitlement to
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do such a thing because the City will argue that your
discretion is exceedingly limited, because the only thing
you have the opportunity of doing is reviewing the facts of
the things that have occurred, the processes that have
occurred and making a determination as to whether or not
those concepts were conducted appropriately, those actions
were conducted approximately, I wish to point out to you
that the Court of Appeals—check that, the Supreme Court in
the Statewide case, used some remarkably interesting
language.
It said that a municipality's land use is
arbitrary and capricious if it is not substantiated by—if
it is not supported by substantial evidence.

And then it

went on to say that the standard of review in determining
whether there was an arbitrary and capricious action that
had been undertaken by a board of adjustments or a city
council, in this case, both the board of adjustments in
this case and the city council, by the way.
Court said that they would review the evidence in
the record to insure that the city proceeded within the
limits of fairness and acted in good faith.
Now, I—I challenge you to consider what the
concept of fairness and acting in good faith would mean.
When you look at Exhibit J and you see that which surrounds
us on—on three sides, and we're not talking about the

23

1

property behind our lot line, to the west of us.

2

recognize that—that there may be difficulty in drawing a

3

boundary behind there because the properties don't all

4

reach the same distance towards 1000 West or something of

5

that character; but when you look at what surrounds us,

6

when you look at the reality of the circumstance and you

7

ask yourself—when you apply the standard of review that

8

the Supreme Court has said you would apply and that is to

9

examine the record to insure that the city proceeded within

10

the limits of fairness and acted in good faith, you can see

11

that is—that they didn't, they haven't.

12

And I

They haven't.

We had a business license so we ought to have

13

been grandfathered.

14

grandfather us; in fact, it's illegal, it's an illegal act.

15

They can't not do that.

16

grandfathered.

17

That's not fair that they didn't

We're entitled to be

We might not have been entitled, I admit, to the

18

zone that—I mean to the license that we got, but we got

19

it.

20

just saying argumentatively, let's suggest that—that we

21

didn't meet all the criteria.

22

Lawson explained that the process is, is for somebody to

23

complain and a review hearing to take place and then if you

24

made an application to revoke, you'd have a hearing to

25

revoke the license; but you don't not grandfather us.

I'm not suggesting that we weren't entitled to it, I'm

24

Well, once we got it, Mr.

If we have the license and you annex us, we're
entitled to continue to do business and we did that, we had
the licenses and we were grandfathered.

Now, that's the

first point.
Second point again is that the A-l zone didn't
change between Salt Lake County and South Salt Lake, the
language didn't change.

We qualified under Salt Lake

County and we don't have any specific exclusions in South
Salt Lake's language that says we don't qualify; therefore,
we do.

And that's what the case law says, as I pointed out

to you in the memorandum.
And in addition to that, as I've said, when you
look at it, it's clearly a reverse spot zone.

That is

precisely what it is, they're treating us unfairly, they're
treating us arbitrarily because they're not allowing us the
opportunity of doing what UTA is doing, what Valley Mental
Health is doing, what—what the GMC dealership is doing and
effectively, the same thing that—that Salt Lake County is
doing when they operate their business operation of the
sheriff's office, the jail, the call center and the Youth
Detention Center.
And for you to think that—that, you know, I—I
admit that those are all public things and I admit that
those public things have exclusions in the language of
statutes of—of the zoning ordinances, but still, the point
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is, is—is that that's the nature of everything that's
there.
And when you look at that, they don't meet the
standard of fairness and good faith and that is the
standcird, that is precisely the standard.

And that's the

standard of review and that's what the case says that it is
and that's still good law.

That's precisely the standard

that you need to be applying in this case.
So, for all of the reasons that I have stated, we
are properly before you with regards to the issue of,
number one, either ordering the City grant us a grandfather
provision or—and—and a new business license in conformity
therewith, or in the alternative and really, it ought to be
"and/or" because I think we're entitled to both, and/or
grant us a zone change because they have not acted, and you
are—you are reviewing both the question of our application
for a business license, we—and you'll see in our factual
allegations, we made an application for a business license,
it was denied, we made an application for a zone change, it
was denied.

So, you're dealing with two sets of records

here, not just one, it's not just the question of the zone
change.
And in both instances, I believe that—that we
have not treated as the Supreme Court requires, as the
Court of Appeals has suggested, the Supreme Court has
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affirmed, with an eye towards fairness and good faith.
Do you have any questions of me, sir?
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Parsons.

MR. PARSONS:

Thank you very much.

I appreciate

your patience.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Before you stand, Mr. Hall,

would the counsel for Lacido versus Airbrooke step forward
please?
(Whereupon, the Court handled an unrelated
matter.)
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr, Hall?
MR. HALL:

Thank you, your Honor.

For the sake of clarity, I'd like to clarify some
misstatements of Mr. Parsons.

It's probably because of his

unfamiliarity with the events and the fact—and the
situation surrounding South Salt Lake.
On October 1st, 1998, the City of South Salt Lake
annexed the property from the south—or the center line of
33rd South all the way to 3900 South, from the Jordan River
east to 700 East.

This was not just some piecemeal

annexation of a few acres of property.

I think the Court

might have got the impression that just the area identified
in green on the map was annexed, but in fact, it was not.
The City went from 3 300 South to 3 900 South, Jordan River
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to 700 East, which was about a 40 percent increase in the
size of the city.
This is an application or a petition for review
of a zoning decision made by the City Council of the City
of South Salt Lake in January of 2000-

Counsel's attempted

to confuse the issue of the petition for review with the
issue of the grandfathering the business license.
Mr. Parsons has filed a separate and independent
action for that.

That is—as Mr. Ferguson has indicated,

that is presently pending before Judge Lewis.
In our motion for summary judgment, we address
briefly the issue of the business license.

If in fact it

is properly before the Court today, we believe that it
needs to be dismissed summarily because he, Mr. Parsons on
behalf of his client, or other counsel, did not follow the
Rules of Administrative Procedure and did not exist their—
exhaust their administrative remedies as provided for by
the business license ordinance of the City of South Salt
Lake.
They had plenty of opportunity to file an appeal
before the hearing license board within 30 days after
denial of their application.

Such took place, the denial

and it is in our memorandum, on July 2nd, 1999.

No appeal

from that denial was taken at all on behalf of Statewide
Bail Bonds or Mr. Ty Webber.

And—
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THE COURT:

Is—is that your response to his

issue of grandfathering, that—was there an independent
response?
MR. HALL:

My response to that is, no, that—that

is not directly our response because we do not believe that
it was grandfathered.

We believe and are prepared in the

other action to show that the license was not properly
issued.
Mr. Lawson, in his deposition on Friday,
testified that, yes, it was a conditional use, a home
occupation under the terms and conditions of the county
zoning ordinance, it was a home occupation; but despite
that fact that a home occupation requires the filing of a
conditional use permit application and going through the
planning and zoning process of Salt Lake County, Mr. Lawson
issued that without any directive, policy or executive
order from the county commission that they just issued the
home occupation.
We submit that that was an illegal act of a
functionary in Salt Lake County and we're prepared to show
that in the action pending before Judge Lewis.
We do not believe that it is a proper item to
bring up under 10-9—or excuse me, yeah, 10-9-1001 of the
Municipal Planning Act.

It says a petition for review may

be filed of a zoning action of a city council or a city, or
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1

this happens to be a board of adjustments, must be filed

2

within the statutory period of 30 days.

3

That's why he's here.

He is appealing from a

4

decision of the city council to deny a request for a

5

rezoning of a single one lot parcel of ground.

6

listen to Mr.—Mr. Parsons today, he would want you to

7

believe that this was a global application for rezoning the

8

whole area.

9

And if you

He's taken much time and effort to explain to you

10

about the uses that exist on 900 West.

11

talking about, Beehive, Hy & Mike's and those sort of

12

things do not exist.

13

property, homes, residential units are owned by those

14

businesses, they're not operating those businesses.

15

The uses that he's

They're only—all parcels of

And in fact, they have had their opportunity

16

before the Planning & Zoning Commission and the city

17

council for rezoning applications and those are also—were

18

rejected by the city council.

19

Now, this is an application for zoning one parcel

20

of ground.

And if you go back to the Eng Floral and the

21

Crestview case in 1979, I believe, more than 20 years ago,

22

it says spot zoning is illegal.

23

carve out one piece, one lot, one residential lot on the

24

west side of 900 West and zone it either commercial or

25

light industrial, that is the classic case of spot zoning.

30

If you take that map and

His argument that it is a reverse spot zoning and not to do
it is fallacious.
Your Honor is well familiar with, I think the—
the code and the state statutes that provide that the
courts shall presume that land use decisions and
regulations of a municipality are valid.

And your only

scope of review is to determine whether or not the decision
is arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
There has been on representation in any
memorandum, any affidavit, that this action by the city
council and the City of South Salt Lake, following the
recommendation, unanimous recommendation of the Planning &
Zoning Commission and the unanimous recommendation of the
community council that it be denied.
The courts have—the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court have recently interpreted what arbitrary and
capricious mean.

And the recent case of Harmon City vs.

the City of Draper talks about reasonably debatable.

Now,

Mr. Parsons and I all day long could debate whether or not
the zoning change is appropriate.

Reasonably debatable.

Now, that the court has said if it's reasonably
debatable and the city—then the following city council
decision should be upheld and it's not arbitrary and
capricious.
I would call the Court's attention to the record,
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the findings of fact and the minutes where both the
Planning & Zoning Commission and the city council, they
entered findings, they entered conclusions.

Based on the

testimony they received, the staff report and the
recommendation they received and the comments of the
applicant and the property owners in the area, all of those
findings and conclusions were consistent.

And the findings

were these:
Number one, the rezoning was contrary to the
general plan.

Mr. Webber did not even apply to amend the

general plan.

He just said, Please rezone my property.

Finding number one is contrary to the general plan.
Number two, we've talked about.

The zoning would

admit—would amount to spot zoning.
Number three, the city has made a decision in the
general plan that this area should remain agricultural.

As

you can see from the map very graphically, the city council
in their policy and legislative decision-making capacity,
have decided they want some agricultural uses in the City
of South Salt Lake.
As you can see, this property across the—the
Jordan River, the city council in 1998 adopted a Jordan
River master plan to preserve the area and the character
and to develop those type of facilities for the benefit of
the residents and the other citizens of the community.
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This general plan in the denial of rezoning is consistent
with that action.
And number four, two-thirds of the city without
the appli—without applying for a conditional use or any
other type of application is available for the
establishment of the business and running the business that
Mr. Parsons' client would like to run.
For example, he could go across the street.

If

he could acquire property, he could operate his business
there.

He mentions that GMC is located right next door.

That is a misstatement.
to this property.

GMC is not located right next door

It's approximately two blocks away on

Seventh West, behind the jail facility and does not even
abut or front this property.

This property of Mr. Webber's

is surrounded on three sides by agriculturally zoned
property.
The Court is familiar with the standard of
review.

The Court must not substitute its judgment for

that of the zoning body, both the Planning & Zoning
Commission and a reference—and also the city council.
Even though the decision could be highly debatable, that
does not render it arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
As the council has set forth, its basis of denial
also—all was—all were supported by testimony,
recommendations and findings.
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We've discussed the issue of spot zoning.

The

only property that was sought to be rezoned in this
application, I reiterate one more time, was the small
parcel owned by Mr. Ty Webber.

It is a home.

He wants to

change that home into a commercial facility surrounded by
agricultural land.

Agricultural land that the city

council, in their legislative position and legislative
capacity has—had determined by the general plan and by the
zoning action on a repeated basis, that it needs to remain
agricultural in nature.
Now, much has been made about UTA, Salt Lake
County Emergency Operation Center, Valley Mental Health.
Those are quasi-public uses.

Quasi-public uses were

allowed in the ordinance as set forth by Salt Lake County.
They are not allowed under amendments to the Salt—to the
City of South Salt Lake zoning ordinance of approximately
six months ago.

The city council is desirous of retaining

that as agricultural in nature.
Your Honor, we believe our motion for summary
judgment is—is well taken.

The Court cannot substitute

its judgment for the legislative body.

Even though it may

be highly debatable, it is not arbitrary, it was not
capricious and there have been no allegations that it is
illegal.
And I'll submit it.
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THE COURT:

Mr- Parsons?

MR. PARSONS:
you.

Just a moment, your Honor. Thank

Appreciate the brevity that Mr. Hall engaged in and

I'll to do likewise here.
Mr. Hall pointed out that the—with regards to
the business license issue, that a procedure for appeal
thereof may have been appropriate at a later point—or at a
prior point in time.

I point you out Exhibits C and D to

our memoranda and the body of our memoranda refers directly
to those issues.
The question of the business license and its
denial was addressed by the City of South Salt Lake in the
letters to Mr. Webber that are Exhibits C and D.

Neither

of those letters contained any findings, neither of those
letters recite any evidence as to why not, they don't give
any reasons as to why not, for the issuance of—the failure
to—to reissue the business license, other than the fact
that they claim that he had an illegal license in the first
place, without saying what illegal meant or how he acquired
an illegal.
And neither of those letters, as is required by
the statute, provided any instructions as to how to appeal
the decision to not give the business license. We are
properly before the Court with regards to the issue of the
business license, having petitioned the Court for a review
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of that subject matter.
The—the concept of—of the spot zoning was an
issue that Mr. Hall raised.

In hearing after hearing,

Beehive representatives, Hy & Mike's representatives,
Sportsmen's representatives, in addition to Mr. Frederick
and Mr. Webber, have all appeared and testified relative to
the desire to make modifications to the zone, the rezone,
so that they can conduct their businesses in the properties
that they own.
So, we are not talking about a spot involving Mr.
Webber, it's just that he's the one that's brought the
action.

And Mr. Webber might well benefit without Hy &

Mike or Beehive or Sportsmen's having to pay the attorney's
fees to bring the action, if the Court were to conclude
that in fact the nature of the property is commercial or
quasi-commercial as opposed to agricultural in character.
And finally, Mr. Hall did not address the
question of whether or not we were or were not qualified
under A-l zoning to do home occupation—a home occupation
business.

They haven't addressed that at all, they didn't

address it in their response to our memoranda, they haven't
addressed it in their oral arguments today.
And as I indicated previously, there's no
question but what the English common law, which has been
followed closely by the Utah Supreme Court and reiterated
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in the cases that I have cited to you, indicates clearly
that if you don't prohibit us and give us an appropriate
reason why the police powers ought to be exercised, to not
allow you to engage in a certain kind of activity, then
you're entitled to use our property as you wish to do so.
That's it.

Thanks, Judge.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do you wish to respond to the last point?
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, the reason we didn't

address the business license is because we believe it's
irrelevant and if it is relevant, they did not exhaust
their administrative remedies.
Mr. Webber's been represented from the beginning
by counsel.

On July 2nd, 1999, he was issued—given a

letter saying that your license will not be—your
application for a license will not be granted and in
accommodation to you, until we—you re—run your zoning
application through the zoning process, we'll let you stay
there; but if it's denied, you must stop your business.
We believe the issue as to the business license,
number one, it's irrelevant to the petition for a review
under 10-1-1001.

That's why—that's the statute under

which Mr. Parsons filed his action.

Now, to bring in this

other issue is irrelevant and even if it is relevant here
today, they did not follow the administrative process and
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the Court is without jurisdiction to hear that.
And I'll submit it.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

It's the Court's decision to grant the motion for
summary judgment of the defendant's.

And my reasoning is,

as argued by Mr. Hall, it is not the Court's prerogative to
substitute its judgments for the city's and I find the
city's actions not to be arbitrary or capricious from the
arguments that have been articulated in oral argument and
also set forth in the briefs.
And to the extent that it's relevant, it seems to
the Court also that there has been a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Mr. Hall, would you prepare an order to the
effect—
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, I will.

THE COURT:

—consistent with my ruling.

All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

MR. HALL:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 38, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 1st day of
February, 2001.

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st
of February, 2001.
NOTARY ^'JQLIC
365 3FAH?v*A OPiVE
&
fXs v ^ J V L * !
MURRAY, 1ST 84107 I
*A^X;*J
COMMISSION EXPIRES j
DEC. 4, 2031
STATE Or UTAH
»•*»»«'* »»ftft»mWB—n

L>f/

«~

v..r r.

Notary Public
( S E A L )
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day

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 38, inclusive, to the best of my
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible,
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd
February, 2001.
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ADDENDUM 8
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

H. CRAIG HALL (1307)
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant
220 East Morris Avenue #200
South Alt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone (801) 478-3607
DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521-5678
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

TY WEBBER and STATEWIDE BAIL
BONDS,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
Civil No. 000901508
Defendant.
Judge William B. Bohling

This matter came before the Court on September 18, 2000 for oral argument on
the following motions:
1.

Defendant City of South Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment;

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Oral Argument;

4.

Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

5.

Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits.

Prior to oral argument, the Court had reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and
exhibits submitted by the parties. Having considered these pleadings and the arguments of
counsel and having issued its ruling from the bench at the conclusion of oral argument on
September 18, 2000, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs3 Motion for Continuance, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits are denied. For
purposes of ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court considered all of the
pleadings submitted by the parties.
2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant City of South Salt Lake is

hereby granted. Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Review of Decision and Amended
Petition for Review of Decision seeking to have this Court judicially review the legislative
zoning decision of the City of South Salt Lake. Plaintiffs' Petition is filed pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101 et seq. and seeks review of a zoning decision pursuant to §
10-9-1001. In conducting the narrow statutory review contemplated, this Court must
limit its review to the record where the record is available and adequate. The Court finds
that the legislative record is available and is adequate. Based upon the legislative record,
-2-

the Court concludes that Defendant's legislative determination denying Plaintiffs' request
to re-zone his property from A-1 (Agriculture) to Business-A was not arbitrary capricious,
or illegal. For this reason and the other reasons set forth in Defendant's supporting
memoranda and exhibits, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken and
granted.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. In addition to

seeking reversal of Defendant's zoning decision based on the legislative record, Plaintiffs
also argue that they are entitled to a zoning change and/or zoning variance because of a
business license issued by Salt Lake County to Plaintiffs to operate their bail bonds
business as a home prior to the property being annexed into the City of South Salt Lake
on October 1, 1998. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies by failing to seek administrative review by the business license
hearing board of City of South Salt Lake of the denial of Plaintiffs' request to issue them a
business license. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue.
For these and the other reasons set forth in Defendant's memoranda and exhibits,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
Based on the foregoing legal findings and conclusions, and for the reasons more
fully set forth in Defendant's legal memoranda, Plaintiffs' Petition for Review and the
claims and causes of action stated therein are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon
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the merits, no cause of action. Each of the parties shall bear his or its respective costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.
DATED this

day of September, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

By
WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

83019.1
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

PENNY L. EDWARDS, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law
offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant, City of South Salt Lake, herein; that
she served the attached Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiffs3 Motion for Summary Judgment in Civil No. 000901508 before the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah upon the parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiff
William B. Parsons IH
440 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
and causing the same to be mailed first class, hand delivered, on the If

day of

September, 2000.

'uvtux^ iztafuds^

J±
Penny L. idwards
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

jcf
| M ' day of September, 2000.

QILV ... or., j ^ r o ^ , ro H 1

Notary Public

ADDENDUM 9
Business License Granted to Statewide Bail Bonds by
Lake County, July 23,1998

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Expires last day of:

DEC 1998

STATEWIDE BAIL BONDS
3350 S 900 W
SALT LAKE CITY

UT

84119IssueDate:

11/04/98

Owner/Agent: TY
WEBBER
Basic Fees

BASIC FEE

$40 00

1

-

Regulatory Fees
l

PHONE AND MAIL

Sl5m

Business Type:
Chair

Account Number: 37430

»

Sa,t Lake Count

y Commission

This license is granted to the Named Company to do the specified business in Salt Lake County at the above address. This Company
has compiied with the provisions of the Ordinances of Salt Lake County governing this type of business and has paid the County
Treasurer the necessary amount to operate such business for the period stated.
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in business within Salt Lake County without first procuring a business license.
(Salt Lake County Ordinance Sec. 5.16.020)
This license is not transferable between owners and/or locations. This license is valid only for type of business stated.

— Post this License in a Conspicuous Place at Business Location —

Business License

ADDENDUM 10
Letter from South Salt Lake City to Tyron (sic) Webber and
Statewide Bail Bonds, July 2,1999

SSL

W
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE

PHONE 801 / 483-6000
FAX 801 / 483-6001
220 EAST MORRIS AVENUE • SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84115-3284

July 2, 1999
Tyron Webber
Statewide Bail Bonds
3350 South 900 West
South Salt Lake, Utah 84119
RE: Business Licensing
Dear Mr. Webber;
You submitted an application for a business license at the above location. We have been
investigating the circumstances regarding the operations and have finally arrived at the following
conclusions:
1. At the Time of annexation, you were operating under a business license issued by Salt
Lake County.
2. The City of South Salt Lake honored that license by allowing operations of a bail
bond office to continue as a nonconforming business with the provision that you meet all
building code requirements for a business (requires an inspection and making any needed
corrections for an approval) and not maintain any outside storage.
3. Since then we have discovered that the business license issued to you by the County
was in violation of the zoning regulations of the County and should NOT have been issued.
Therefore, your business was NOT a legally operating business at the time of annexation and. as
such, does not have any legal nonconforming status.
4. The property is presently found within an A-l zone which does NOT allow
businesses of your type (the same as the County).
5. The City will not issue a new license for the property but, in the interest of equitable
treatment and due to annexation issues, will allow a reasonable time for the operations to be
relocated before taking any steps to force complete cessation of operations as noted in number 2
herein. We will allow operation for the remainder of the year (to December 31, 1999) provided
the items in number 6 herein are met.
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6. In order to continue ANY operations, you need to comply with the terms of the
original determination (see number 2 herein) by obtaining an inspection, making all necessary
corrections, and ceasing all outside storage within 30 days of this letter OR you may cease all
operations and relocate within the same time frame. You decide the best course for you.
Should you desire to continue with a request for a change in zoning, you need to finish
the Community Council process and submit a petition to the Planning Office, and, at the same
time, request a review of the General Plan. Be advised that the chances of such happening
quickly are slim, and the likelihood of any approval, at this time in the City's evolution and
given the history of the area and the General Plan process, are negligible (the Planning
Commission has held a Public Hearing on a request to change some zoning in the area and
determined that they would not support any such change without a change in the General Plan of
the City occurring first - no such change has occurred or is even in the works).
Should you have further questions, feel free to contact the Community Development
Department at 483-6011. For inspection scheduling, please call Business Licensing at 483-6063

Sincerely,

^JA
Bruce Talbot, Director
Community and Economic Development

Cherie Wood
Business License Official

cc:

Craig Hall, City Attorney
Corey Carlson, Enforcement Officer
Greg Sauter, Inspector
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